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TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND NECESSITY AT% COMMON LAW
David R. Lowry*
I. Introduction
Emergency powers have existed in Northern Ireland from the beginning of
the state in 1920.' Northern Ireland came into being as a result of the partition
of Ireland by the British Parliament, whereby the six north-eastern counties of
Ireland remained an integral part of the United Kingdom.2 Following partition,
one-third of the population of Northern Ireland were Catholics who were pre-
dominately Nationalist or Republican in ideology.' As a consequence, partition
was viewed as a huge gerrymander and a denial of self-determination of the en-
closed Nationalist minority.' Civil unrest has been a recurring feature in Northern
Ireland' and government has been conducted by the dominant group (Protes-
tant), without consensus, since 1920.'
For the purposes of this article it is significant to note that elements of the
minority have, from time to time, resorted to force of arms in pursuit of an
irredentist political philosophy.' Because of the state's monopoly of force, the
* Associate Professor, University of Toledo, College of Law. LL.B. (1969) Queen's
University, Belfast; LL.M. (1970) New York University; LL.M. (1973) Columbia University,
A.C.I.S., Barrister and Solicitor, Nova Scotia, Canada..
1 The fifth statute enacted by the fledgling Northern Irish Parliament (Stormont) was a
particularly wide and odious emergency powers statute. Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c.5 (N.I.) as amended by 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c.12 (N.I.) (1932).
For an analysis of the early operation of this statute see, National Council for Civil Liberties,
The Special Powers Acts of Northern Ireland (1936). For an assessment of the operation of
the act between 1944 and 1954 see Edwards, Special Powers in Northern Ireland CRiM. L.
REv. 7 (1956). For a brief assessment of the role of the act in exacerbating the current con-
flict see K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN
IRELAND 6-36 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Law and State).
2 The partition was created by a statute of the British Parliament, Government of Ireland
Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c.67. For a lucid account of the partition of Ireland see N. MAN-
SERGH, THE IRISH QUESTION 1840-1921 (3d ed. 1975) and N. MANSERGH, THE GOVERN-
MENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1936). An excellent succinct account of the constitutional
history of Northern Ireland is now available: T. W. MOODY, THE ULSTER QUESTION 1603-
1973 (1974). An admirably eclectic survey of constitutional law and history is found in Palley,
The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution,
I ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV. 368 (1972).
3 Several works chronicle the fate of the Catholic minority in the new state of Northern
Ireland. In particular, see F. LYON, IRELAND SINCE THE FAMINE (1971); L. DE PAOR,
DIVIDED ULSTER (1970); M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE (1976).
For a Marxian view of partition in an historical perspective, see T. JACKSON, IRELAND HER
OWN (1947).
4 For an explanation of this viewpoint, see, e.g., S. MAcSTIOFAIN, MEMOIRS OF A REVOLU-
TIONARY (1975). From 1970-1973 Mr. MacStiofain was Chief-of-Staff and founder of the
newly formed Provisional I.R.A.
5 A short description of civil unrest since 1920 is found in A. BOYD, HOLY WAR IN
BELFAST (2d ed. 1970). For an analysis of the much used internment power under the Special
Powers Act, see J. MCGUFFIN, INTERNMENT (1973).
6 On the precise nature of the devolved government in Northern Ireland, see R. ROSE,
GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CONSENSUS (1971); D. BARRETT & C. CARTER, THE NORTHERN
IRELAND PROBLEM: A STUDY IN GROUP RELATIONS (1962).
7 For a critical exposition of nationalist thinking see E. MCCANN, WAR AND AN IRISH
TOWN (1974). For the role of the I.R.A., see J. BELL, THE SECRET ARMY (1970) and T.
COOGAN, THE I.R.A. (1970).
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activities of the militant irredentists have been confined to guerilla campaigns.
And, since 1971,8 the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) has embarked upon a
protracted guerilla campaign which has emphasized a shift from rural to urban
guerilla warfare or urban terrorism.9 Such terrorism constitutes a shift from
direct terror to indirect terror in that its primary objective is to demonstrate that
the state cannot protect its citizens, cannot enforce the rule of law and is, conse-
quently, ungovernable.1" Indirect forms of terror have led to new attritional
policies of counter-terror (counter-insurgency) whereby the military and the
police seek primarily to "contain" terror prior to its gradual elimination.1 How-
ever, new systems of terrorism and counter-insurgency do not operate in a legal
vacuum. The primary objective of this article is to examine the legal framework
under which the continuing Northern Irish urban guerilla warfare and counter-
insurgency tactics operate. Secondly, the recently developed and applied theories
of counter-insurgency will be identified and analyzed. Finally, some conclusions
will be drawn from the Northern Irish experience regarding, on the one hand,
civil liberties and human rights and, on the other hand, legal controls over mili-
tary behavior in a contemporary emergency situation.
II. Counter-Insurgency: The Legal Framework
During war or insurrection there is a manifest need for strong and effective
government. Even liberal democratic systems of government reserve the right to
concentrate power in the hands of the executive during an emergency or crisis.1
Historically society responded to war and similar crises by declaring martial law
by which the executive exercised the right to use force against force within the
realm in order to suppress disorder." Under early English law, the monarch
8 For the origin of the present I.R.A. campaign, see C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND
(1972); Sunday Times Insight Team, Northern Ireland (1972); and R. DEUTSCH & V.
MAGOWAN, NORTHERN IRELAND 1968-1973: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, vol. I 1968-71
(1973).
9 For an interesting comparative analysis see J. BELL, ON REVOLT: STRATEGIES OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION (1976).
10 For a fuller explanation of direct and indirect forms of terrorism, see E. HYAMS,
TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM ch. 1 '(1974).
11 Modern theories of counter-terror or counter-insurgency are found in J. McCuEN,
THE ART OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1966); R. THOMPSON, DEFEATING COM-
MUNIST INSURGENCY (1966); F. KITSON, Low INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION,
INSURGENCY, PEACEKEEPING (1971) (hereinafter cited as Kitson). The latter work is of
particular importance in the context of the present Irish crisis and has inluenced military
theory, strategy and response to the I.R.A. campaign. For an informative critical evaluation of
Kitson's theories, see J. KELLY, GENESIS OF REVOLUTION (1976). Mr. Kelly was, until recent-
ly, head of Irish Army Intelligence for Northern Ireland.
12 One commentator has observed that war requires "totalitarian" government (K.
WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 187 (4th ed. 1963)), while another has used the descriptive
term "constitutional dictatorship" (C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship at 4-5 (1948)).
13 There are various definitions of martial law but the most appealing is that of the Duke
of Wellington: "Martial law is neither more nor less than the will of the General who com-
mands the army. In fact, martial law means no law at all." HANSARD, col. 880 (1851). How-
ever, in this instance the Duke of Wellington was referring to the relationship of the military to
alien enemies when abroad. Martial law also encompasses the right of the executive to suspend
or supersede municipal law in order to suppress internal civil disorder. On the various meanings
attributed to the term "martial law" see R. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONA LAW 150-53
(2d ed. 1964); I. BROWNLIE, THE LAw RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER 124-25 (1968). Perhaps
the most extensive study of martial law is to be found in C. FAIRIIAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL
RULE (2d ed. 1943) and C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE AND THE NATIONAL
EMERGENCY, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1253 (1941-42). Note that some American commentators use
the term "martial rule" in preference to "martial law."
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sometimes issued commissions to try subjects under martial law in peacetime.'4
This practice was curtailed by the Petition of Right in 1628," and thereafter the
Crown was prevented from using military courts rather than ordinary courts of
law in times of peace.'" With the exception of an unused and short-lived statutory
imposition of martial law in 1914," the executive has not resorted to martial law
in Britain (as opposed to Ireland and the Colonies)'" since the eighteenth
century.' 9 However, it is clear that the prerogative power to declare martial law
in war was not extinguished by the Petition of Right and is now vested in the
executive.2" Additionally, some commentators take the view that the common
law confers a duty upon the executive to use whatever force is necessary to sup-
press civil disorder.2
The justification for martial law is found in the doctrine of necessity.2
Once the courts have been satisfied that war exists,2 they will not further
scrutinize military actions or related executive acts durante bello.24 One jurist has
noted that: "Martial law arises from the State necessity, and is justified at the
common law by necessity, and by necessity alone.... . 25 A major difficulty lies
in the fact that, as martial law has rarely been used in Britain, there is a paucity
of direct judicial and legislative authority prescribing the parameters of extremely
wide and unfettered executive powers.20 But it is clear that the courts do not
regard martial law as "law"2 7 and that military tribunals are not courts but ad-
visory committees carrying out the orders of the military commander.2" This
policy of judicial abnegation ceases when war terminates, at which time the
military authorities may be held liable ex post facto for actions in excess of the
powers conferred.2"
14 F. MAINLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 266-67 (1908),
who asserts that this questionable practice of permitting martial law to exist in peacetime
alongside regular courts was never subject to judicial review because "[t]he judges of the courts
of common law were very distinctly the king's servants."
15 [1628] 3 Car. I, c. 1.
16 For an illuminating historical analysis of martial law see Holdsworth, Martial Law
Historically Considered, 18 LAW Q. REv. 117 (1902).
17 Defense of the Realm Act (No. 2), 1914, 4 & 5 Geo.5 c.63. See also Bowman,
Martial Law and the English Constitution, 15 MIcH. L. REv. 93 (1916).
18 See also K. Roberts-Wray, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAw 642-43 (1966).
19 "[Mjartial law has never been attempted to be exercised [since the Petition of Right]
in the realm of England by virtue of the prerogative." per Lord Cockburn C.J. in R v. Nelson &
Brand, F. Cockburn Sp. Rep. (1867). For a contrary interpretation, see Pollock, What Is
Martial Law?, 18 LAw Q. REv. 152, 155. (1902).
20 Egan v. Macready [1921], 1 IR. 265.
21 MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 267; HEUSTON, supra note 13, at 152.
22 For a lucid examination of the necessity doctrine see D. KXm & F. LAWSON, CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-40 (4th ed. 1954).
23 The courts have expressly reserved the right to review whether the crisis calls for a
oufficient use of military power to justify a state of war, R(Garde) v. Strickland, [1921] 2 I.R.
317.
24 Knm & LAWSON, supra note 22, at 435-36.
25 Dodd, The Case of Marais, 18 LAW Q. REv. 143, 145 (1902).
26 Much of the case law and legislation judicially considered relates to colonial unrest or
disturbances in Ireland. See also KEIR & LAWSON, supra note 22, at 432.
27 Re Clifford and O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570.
28 R v. Allen, [1921] I.R. 241. Similarly the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it has
no power to review the proceedings of a military commission, the commission not being part of
the judicial system, Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
29 Higgins v. Willis, [1921] 2 I.R. 386. Usually an Act of Idemnity is passed to retrospec-
tively protect people who have acted in good faith. See, e.g., Indemnity Act, 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. 5 c. 48.
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Thus, while direct precedent is scarce,3" martial law allows for uncontrolled
use of exceptional measures. The courts regard martial law as non-justiciable
durante bello and refuse to balance the potentially tyrannical nature of unfettered
military power against the rights and privileges of the citizen. 1 Furthermore, in
this century British courts have retreated from the traditional safeguard estab-
lished in the Wolfe Tone Case,32 namely that civilians could not be tried by
courts-martial while the ordinary courts were still open."
The modern reality of the sweeping nature of common law war powers
makes martial law superfluous. 4 By prerogative,35 common law 6 and, more
30 It would be wrong, however, to deduce that British history is free from violent protest
and insurrection. One recent study analyzed such events between 1485 and 1976 and found
that there had been 209 uprisings and insurrections. N. Pennick, British Disaffection (1976)
(unpublished). For a short review of this study see Peace News (London), Feb. 11, 1977, at 12.
31 After analyzing the relevant case law KEIR & LAWSON, supra note 22, at 437, make the
startling observation:
On the one hand, the citizen should not be subject to acts of tyranny at the hands of
one who cannot be made responsible: on the other hand every argument against
allowing the courts to interfere with the course of military operations weighs equally
heavily against submitting every one/of the commander-in-chief's acts to be judged by
a common jury. These are matters for experts ...
This reflects the view in R v. Allen, supra note 28 (Malony, C. J.), in which the Court refused
to review a death sentence imposed by the British military commander in Ireland:
It is the sacred duty of this court to protect the lives and liberties of all His
Majesty's subjects, and to see that no one suffers loss of life or liberty save under
the laws of the country; but when subjects of the King rise in armed insurrection
and the conflict is still raging, it is no less our duty not to interfere with the officers
of the Crown in taking such steps as they deem necessary to quell the insurrection
. . . [this court] . . . cannot, durante bello, control the military authorities, or ques-
tion any sentence imposed in the exercise of martial law. . . . It seems competent, if
war exists, for the military authorities to use special military Court machinery, and
to impose any sentence, even death, without being disabled. . . . When peace is
restored, acts in excess of what necessity requires . . . may require the protection of
indemnifying legislation.
2 I.R. 241 at 264, 272.
32 27 State Tr. 759 (1798). For an interesting comment on this rulin, see HEUSTON,
supra note 13, at 36-38. The Wolfe Tone ruling was later reiterated in The Joint Opinion of
the Law Officers of the Crown (Sir J. Campbell and Sir R. Rolfe), Re: Power of the Governor
of Canada to proclaim Martial Law (1838), reprinted in KEIR & LAWSON, supra note 22, at
445-46.
33 Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109 (P.C.) later applied in R v. Allen, [1921] 2 I.R. 241
(1921) and R. (Childers) v. Adjutant-General, [1923] I.R. 5. An interesting contrast with
Marais is provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
121-22 (1866) (Chase, C.J.), which relied upon British Constitutional practice prior to
Marais and applied the Wolfe Tone ruling. The court formulated a markedly different test
from Marais, namely: "The necessity must be actual and present: the invaslnn renl. such as
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." Id. at 127. The test in
Milligan was later modified in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) regarding a Governor's
liability, but was reaffirmed in Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). See also Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 326 et seq. (1946) (concurring) (Murphy, J.). For a critique of
Milligan, see Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 HARV. L.
REv. 1253 (1942). On the use of martial law in Hawaii during World War II, see Farrell,
Civil Functions of the Military and Implications of Martial Law, 22 U. KAN. CITv L. Rv.
157 (1954) and Frank, ex parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii,
44 COL. L. REv. 639 (1944). For an excellent discussion of martial law in America in an his-
torical perspective see F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTIcE (1967).
34 This view is shared by some leading contemporary British constitutional lawyers. See,
e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 125 and S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 518 (2d ed. 1973).
35 Thus, e.g., the actual declaration of war is a prerogative power as are the powers to
intern and deport enemy aliens; R v. Bottrill, ex parte Kuechenmeister, [19471 K.B. 41; R v.
Vine Street Police Station Superintendent, ex parte Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. 268; R v. Com-
mandant of Knockaloe Camp, ex parte Forman, [1917] 117 L.T. 627. See also Garner,
Treatment of Enemy Aliens, 12 A.J.I.L. 27 (1918). On the seizure of property by prerogative
(October 1977]
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usually, statutory emergency powers," the executive possesses broad power to
suspend civil liberties, deny access to judicial review, 8 and curtail parliamentary
scrutiny of executive action 9 while concentrating control into its own hands. In
fact, short of a nuclear war,40 it is difficult to envisage the future use of martial
law in Britain, since virtually identical "emergency powers" are readily available.
Moreover, emergency powers of a statutory nature do not carry the stigma of
martial law nor entail the likelihood of close international political and judicial
scrutiny"1 and opprobrium. 2
Appellate rulings arising out of the operation of emergency powers during
World War I provide the basis for determining the limits upon executive power.
The case law of this period of particular doctrinal importance reveals, on the one
hand, judicial abnegation regarding the protection of civil liberty and, on the
other hand, a cautiously responsive and protective judicial attitude toward the
power, see Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508; Burmah Oil
Co. Ltd., v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75; and The Broadmayne, P. 64 (1916). On the
right of angary, see Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. the Board of Trade, [1925] 1
K.B. 271. On the residual nature of prerogative power, see A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 430 et seq. (10th ed. 1965).
36 For example, the right of the Crown to enter private property and construct defense
works to repel an' invasion see The Case of the King's Prerogative in Satpetre, 12 Co.Rep.
12 '(1606). See also S.9., Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c.62. For
common law doctrine of the duty to suppress disorder, see the charge to the grand jury in the
Bristol Riots Case, 3 State Tr. N.S. 1; 5 C & P 261 (1832) (Tindal, C. J.); R v. The In-
habitants of Wigan, I Wm.B1. 47 (1749); REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FEATHERSTONE RIOTS,
PARL. PAPERS C.7234 (1893-94). For a brief resume of law relating to the use of the military
in aid of the Civil Powers, see 2 MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, S.V. (1951).
37 Emergency legislation, as enacted in this century, has usually delegated wide law-making
powers to the Executive, see The Defense of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo.5,
c.8; Defense of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915 5 Geo.5, c.34; Emergency Powers Act,
1920, 10 & 11 Geo.5, c.48; Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c.62;
Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo.6, c.20; Emergency Powers (Defense) (No.
2) Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo.6, c.45; Emergency Powers Act, 1964, c.38.
38 Although it should be noted that, following a discernible policy of judicial abnegation
in emergency situations, the courts will refuse to question the ultra vires nature of the exercise
of executive action in the absence of mala tides. See McEldowney v. Forde, [1971] A.C. 632;
[1969] 3 W.L.R. 179 (H.L.). For the limits of judicial review of civil liberties in an emergency,
see the landmark case Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.). See also Greene v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284 and, more recently, Employment Sec. v.
ASLEF, (No. 2), [1972] 2 Q.B. 455. On the doctrine Salus Populi Suprema Lex, see Lowry,
Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 261 (1976).
39 In constitutional theory the Executive is answerable to Parliament even on matters of
national security. In reality, however, Cabinet Ministers usually refuse to answer to Parliament
on the grounds of national security. For a study of parliamentary questioning concerning in-
ternment under wartime emergency conditions and the use of the national security rationale,
see Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Experience, 6 STAN. L. Rav. 238
(1954). However, parliamentary review of delegated legislation in normal times is hardly
noticeable or, in the view of DE SMITH, supra note 34, such review "tends to be perfunctory"
at 333.
40 For an interesting American analysis of the role of law in a modern nuclear war setting,
see Cavers, Legal Planning Against the Risk of Atomic War, 55 COL. L. REv. 127 (1955).
See also R. RANKIN & W. DALLMAYR, FREEDOM AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE COLD WAR
55-81 (1964).
41 On the international justiciability of emergency legislation under Article 15 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, see Lawless v. Ireland, [1958] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 308 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights) and [1961] 4 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 438. For an account of this ruling see A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 51-3, 111-14 & 212-21 (2d ed. 1977).
42 For an assessment of the significance of international public opinion and the role of
international prestige in the enforcement of human rights see Bilder, Rethinking International
Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, Wisc. L. REv. 171, 193 et seq. (1969).
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protection of property rights from arbitrary executive action under the guise of
prerogative power.
Pursuant to wide powers conferred by the emergency legislation enacted
for World War I, the Home Secretary (a cabinet officer) sought to authorize,
by delegation legislation, extra-judicial preventive detention by executive action.4"
The use of this internment power was quickly challenged in a case which was to
become a constitutional cause celebre and a leading authority confirming un-
limited executive power in an emergency. In R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig,"
certain internment provisions of the Defense of the Realm (Consolidation) Act4
were challenged. Section 1 (1) of the Act conferred power upon the executive
during the duration of the War (World War I) "to issue regulations for securing
the public safety and the defense of the realm" and Regulation 14B," made in
purported exercise of this power, empowered the Home Secretary to intern
-jersons posing a threat to national security.
Under this Regulation the Home Secretary ordered the detention of one
Zadig, who was a naturalized British subject of German birth. Zadig, having un-
successfully argued before the Advisory Committee, applied for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that Regulation 14B was ultra vires the Defense of the
Realm (Consolidation) Act of 1914. The Court of Appeal unanimously dis-
missed his appeal on the basis that the regulation impugned was authorized by
the express language of the Act, which was precise, clear, and free from am-
biguity. Zadig appealed to the House of Lords.
The challenged Regulation had been passed as passions became inflamed
with the escalation of World War I, and the Halliday case demonstrates that the
House of Lords was similarly subject to such feelings. The Lord Chancellor,
Lord Finlay, delivered the majority judgment and affirmed the Court of Ap-
peal." Having noted that Parliament had power to pass the Act, Lord Finlay
then examined the construction of the Act and dealt with the six main arguments
of the appellants, which may be summarized: (1) that some limitation must be
put upon the general words of the statute; (2) that there was no provision for
imprisonment without trial; (3) that the provisions made by the Defense of the
Realm Act 1914, for the trial of British subjects by a civil court with a jury
strengthened the contention of the appellant; (4) that general words in a statute
could not take away the vested rights of the subject or alter the fundamental law
of the constitution; (5) that the statute was in its nature penal and must be strictly
43 A brief note on the World War I legislation is found in H. BELLOT, LEADING CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-29 (7th ed. 1934).
44 [1917] A.C. 260.
45 [1914] 5 Geo.5, c.8.
46 Defense of the Realm Consolidated Regulations, Reg. No. 14B, stated, inter alia:
Where on the recommendation of a competent naval or military authority or of
one of the advisory committees hereinafter mentioned it appears to the Secretary of
State that for securing the public safety or the defense of the realm it is expedient in
view of the hostile origin or associations of any person that he shall be subjected to
such obligations and restrictions as are hereinafter mentioned, the Secretary of State
may by order require that person . . . to be interned in such place as may be
specified in the order.
47 See Garner, Treatment of Enemy Aliens, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 27 (1918), for the legisla-
tive history of Regulation 14B.
48 Lords Dunedin, Atkinson'and Wrenbury delivered separate concurring opinions.
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construed; (6) that a construction that is repugnant to the constitutional tradi-
tions could not be adopted. Counsel for the appellant had also argued historically,
recalling various interferences with habeas corpus in times of danger and ques-
tioned why historical precedent had not been followed.
Lord Finlay rejected all of the appellant's arguments. On the argument
that untrammelled emergency powers could result in the use of the death penalty
without judicial review, Lord Finlay responded:
It appears to me to be a sufficient answer to this argument that it may be
necessary in time of great public danger to entrust great powers to his
Majesty in Council, and that Parliament may do so feeling certain that such
powers will be reasonably exercised.
4 9
Thus, the purpose of the legislation, in the opinion of Lord Finlay, overrode
the principles of construction and the requirement of meaningful judicial review
in emergency situations." -The majority opinions show that the House of Lords
was prepared to assume that Parliament had intended to devolve to the executive
complete and unfettered discretion to implement whatever measures the executive
might deem to be necessary for defense. The real or actual necessity for the
measures thus chosen was not justiciable as the majority would not inquire into
the executive definition of the threat to "public safety." Thus the majority saw
the emergency powers possessed by the executive as analogous to the Crown
Prerogative insofar as the only safeguard against abuse in the absence of mala
fides"l is parliamentary scrutiny. Similarly, the majority took the view that the
power conferred by the words of the statute was "subjective" to the Home
Secretary and incapable of objective judicial oversight."
Lord Shaw delivered a lengthy and, in parts, obscure dissent." His Lordship
thought that the detention of "[persons] . . .of hostile origins and associations"
was vague in the extreme"4 and took up counsel's point regarding unscrutinized
summary execution by asking the question ".. . why, on the same principle and in
the exercise power [of internment], may he not be shot out of hand?"55 And on
the constructive or implied repeal of constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus
Lord Shaw concluded his dissent by restating the hitherto generally accepted
49 See note 44, supra, at 268-69.
50 The statute was passed at a time of supreme national danger, which still exists.
The danger of espionage and of damage by secret agents to ships, railways, munition
works, bridges, etc. had to be guarded against. The restraint imposed may be a
necessary measure of precaution, and in the interests of the whole nation it may be
regarded as expedient that such an order should be made in suitable cases. This
appears to me to be the meaning of the statute. Id. at 269.
51 However, the difficulty in showing mala fides was illustrated in a case concerning Regu-
lation No. 2 of the 1914 Act. In Sheffield Conservative and Unionist Club Limited v. Brighten,
32 T.L.R. 598, 85 L.J.K.B. 1669 (1916), the premises of a club were taken by the executive
acting under powers conferred in Regulation No. 2. It was held that the purpose for which
they were taken, even if only indirectly necessary for defense, was intra vires the Regulation.
It had been argued that the military authorities had acted so unreasonably that they could not
have acted in good faith, but Avory held that unless the court could say that the action
af the authorities was so unreasonable as to be obviously not bona fide, the opinion of the
military would be conclusive.
52 See Lord Finlay, supra note 44, at 269 and Lord Atkinson at 271-2.
53 Id. at 276 et seq.
54 Id. at 292.
55 Id. at 291.
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principles of statutory construction that constitutional safeguards must be ex-
pressly, rather than impliedly, repealed by a statute."6 Lord Shaw took the view
that, notwithstanding the breadth of the emergency powers granted by the leg-
islature to the executive, it was incumbent upon the courts to strictly scrutinize the
enabling statute prior to declaring delegated legislation to be intra vires. But only
Lord Shaw, dissenting, thought that the fundamental issue of abuse of executive
abrogation of civil liberty in an emergency was a justiciable issue. Thus a major-
ity of the House of Lords abstained from examining the subjective exercise of
discretion by the Minister of Home Affairs when detaining people without trial
as a preventive measure during an emergency.
The outbreak of hostilities in 1939 caused the issue of internment to again
provide the House of Lords with an opportunity to circumscribe emergency
powers and yet again the court abrogated its duty to judicially scrutinize execu-
tive action. The source of the power to intern during World War II in Britain
was the Emergency Powers (Defense) Act of 193917 which provided the Execu-
tive in the person of the Home Secretary with, inter alia, wide powers of intern-
ment.5" Pursuant to these powers the executive passed Regulation 18B which
gave the power to intern suspects "[I]f the Secretary of State has reasonable
cause to believe any person to be of hostile origins or associations." 9 That the
scope of this power to intern is very wide is obvious from the draftsman's use of
"reasonable cause to believe" rather than the World War I term "satisfied."6
The precise nature of the powers conferred and the courts' willingness to scruti-
nize executive acts of internment were quickly brought before the House of Lords
in the landmark civil liberties ruling of Liversidge v. Anderson."'
In this case a detention order was made by the Home Secretary against
Liversidge (alias Perlzweig) on the ground that he had reasonable cause to
believe that Liversidge was a person of hostile associations, and that it was there-
fore necessary to exercise control over him. Liversidge was accordingly detained
56 In the latest edition of Maxwell on. the Interpretation of Statutes, I find the
law exactly as I view it stated thus: "Repeal by implication is not favored. A sufficient
Act ought not to be held to be repealed by implications without some strong reason.
It is a reasonable presumption that the legislature did not intend to keep really
contradictory enactments in the statute book, or, on the other hand, to effect so
important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so.
Such an interpretation, therefore, is not to be adopted unless it be inevitable. Any
reasonable construction which offers an escape from it is more likely to be in con-
sonance with the real intention." [1917] A.C. 260 at 268.
The construction I have ventured to propose appears to me to be not unreasonable,
but to square with every familiar and accustomed canon. I think that the judgment
of the Courts below is erroneous, and is fraught with grave legal and constitutional
danger. In my opinion the appeals should be allowed, the regulation challenged
should be declared ultra vires, and the appellant should be set at liberty.
[1917] A.C. 260 at 305.
57 [1939] 2 & 3 Geo.6, c.62.
58 "[Defense Regulations] . . . for the detention of persons whose detention appears to the
Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of the public safety or the defense of the
realm." Id. at S. 1 (2) (9).
59 S.R. & 0., 1939, No. 1681, Regulation 18B, % 1. For a discussion of the origin of
Regulation 18B, see COTTER, supra note 39, at 239-42.
60 See also C. K. ALLEN, LAW AND ORDERS 412-26 app. '(3d ed. 1964).
61 11942] A.C. 206. See also Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect, 86 LAW Q.
Rav. 33 (1970); Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson: Two Footnotes, 87 LAW Q. REv. 161
(1972).
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in Brixton Prison, and the next year he sought a writ against the Home Secretary,
containing a declaration that his detention was unlawful and claiming damages
for false imprisonment. The Home Secretary did not make any affidavit showing
why, or on what information, he had reached his decision, but merely produced
the order purporting to be made under Regulation 18B. The action proceeded
on a claim for particulars of defense: there was no suggestion that the Home
Secretary had not acted in good faith; and the House of Lords, with Lord Atkin
dissenting, held that the order was valid and the Home Secretary's answer suf-
ficient.
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham took the view that internment under
the Regulations was a matter for executive discretion and that the Home Secre-
tary was not acting judicially. Moreover, Lord Maugham recognized that a
decision to intern must necessarily be based upon confidential information but
that the Home Secretary was answerable to Parliament in this regard and not to
the courts. 2 His Lordship noted that Parliamentary scrutiny was envisaged by
the Regulation as the Home Secretary had to give a monthly report to Parlia-
ment 3 and the internee's only redress was seen to be recourse to the Home
Secretary's Advisory Board. 4 In Lord Maugham's view the words "reasonable
cause to believe" meant that the Home Secretary should personally consider each
case and the only requirement placed upon him by law was that he must act in
good faith.6" Lord Maugham's opinion, and the concurring opinions, 6 empha-
size the fact that the powers conferred upon the executive were emergency ex-
ecutive powers at a time of great national peril and were necessary on grounds of
national security. Thus the majority abrogated their duty to scrutinize executive
acts on the grounds of Salus Populi Suprema Lex
7
Lord Atkin, in a famous and spirited dissent, was far more conscious of the
fundamental constitutional issue of civil liberty and refused to see the issue solely
as one of technical construction.6" Rejecting the majority's view that the words
must be construed subjectively, Lord Atkin emphasized that the words "if he has
reasonable cause to believe" did not mean "if he thinks he has reasonable cause
to believe" and that consequently the words had an objective meaning giving
rise to a justiciable issue." Lord Atkin scathingly characterized the majority view
62 [1942] A.C. at 218.
63 But the Home Secretary could avoid particularized parliamentary questioning on the
grounds of "national security." See COTrER, supra note 39.
64 "It seems to me that, if any . . . appeal had been thought proper, it would have
been to a special tribunal with power to inquire privately into all the reasons for the
Secretary's action, but without any obligation to communicate them to the person
detained." [19421 A.C. at 222.
65 Id. at 219.
66 Lords MacMillan, Romer and Wright issued separate opinions concurring with Lord
Maugham, L.C.
67 See also R v. Home Secretary ex- parte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72.
68 In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been
one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which on recent
authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of persons and stand
between the subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive,
alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to
arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench




and respondents' arguments as analogous to a children's fantasy."0
However, Lord Atkin joined the majority in a subsequent case in which the
House of Lords dismissed an appeal on an application for habeas corpus arising
out of the same Regulation, 1 and the Liversidge ruling became the authoritative
decision regarding justiciability of executive actions affecting individual liberty
during an emergency.7" The recent House of Lords ruling in McEldowney v.
Forde7 has reaffirmed Liversidge by holding that when individual liberty is
curtailed by executive action under emergency legislation, the executive is im-
mune from subsequent judicially imposed accountability in the absence of mala
fides.
The House of Lords, as court of last resort, has demonstrated a consistent
policy of judicial abnegation in failing to define the limits of executive discretion
under statutory emergency powers and has ensured that executive incursions
into the field of civil liberties remain non-justiciable in the absence of mala fides.
By failing to afford the citizen a forum or redress against arbitrary use of un-
fettered executive powers the courts have blocked one important avenue of
legitimate protest.
However, while the doctrinal cases reveal extreme reluctance on the part of
the courts to scrutinize emergency executive actions in the area of individual rights
or civil liberties, one field of constitutional rights benefitted from an assertive and
protective judicial posture, namely the rights to private property. The courts
adopted an activist stance in circumscribing executive emergency activities in the
areas of taxation and acquisition of property.
This activist stance in proprietarian matters is illustrated by controversial
emergency legislation enacted during World War I which empowered the execu-
tive to requisition ships.74 Pursuant to this power, the executive passed a regula-
tion directing a shipping company to continue plying its trade but, henceforth,
70 I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of con-
struction: " 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,
'it means what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said
Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question
is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's all.'" ("Through the
Looking Glass," c.vi.) After all this long discussion the question is whether the words
'If a man has' can mean 'If a man thinks he has.' I am of opinion that they can-
not, and that the case should be decided accordingly. Id. at 245.
71 Greene v. Home Secretary, [1942] A.G. 284. In this case the Home Secretary filed an
affidavit setting out some particulars and stating that he had acted upon information obtained
from responsible and experienced persons. Here Lord Atkin held this affidavit to be a sufficient
answer and refused to inquire further into the necessity or justification of the appellant's
internment.
72 See, e.g., Budd v. Anderson, [1943] 1 K.B. 642. However, Liversidge received a mixed
reception from contemporary legal commentators. See, e.g., C. K. ALLEN, suprz note 60: D.
KEIR & F. LAWSON, supra note 22, at 262-64. Perhaps because of the controversy surrounding
the Liversidge ruling the House of Lords, sitting as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil on an appeal from Ceylon, was at pains to point out that Liversidge applied only to
judicial review of executive acts in emergency conditions; Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951]
A.C. 66.
73 See note 38 supra. For an assessment of the contribution of this judicial posture to the
escalation of the Northern Irish conflict, see T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, JUSTICE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CONFIDENCE 8-20 (1973). In Northern Ireland judicial abnega-
tion regarding emergency powers has had the effect of tacitly reinforcing a repressive status
quo while concomitantly closing the last outlet for legitimate protest. It was only after the
McEldowney ruling that street protest and civil rights demonstrations grew in size and number.
74 Defense of the Realm (Consolidated) Regulations, Regulation 39B.
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to do so on behalf of the government which was to be credited with all earnings
which accrued. In China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. MacLay, 5 the
shipping company credited its own account with the profits, claiming that the
government was not entitled to the earnings since the empowering regulation was
ultra vires, being tantamount to taxation without the clear authority of Parlia-
ment. Although declaring the impugned regulation to be intra vires,71 it was
nevertheless held by Bailhache, J. that the executive directive which ordered
the shippers to continue running the company was, in fact, ultra vires."7 The
learned judge took the view that power to requisition ships, while valid in itself,
did not include the power to requisition the services of the owners. Bailhache,
J. concluded by indicating that the owners should be subjected to "negotiations"
rather than "command."
7'
While China Mutual was not appealed beyond the trial stage, the Court of
Appeal was soon presented with the opportunity to establish the parameters of
the constitutionality of executive taxing powers during an emergency. In At-
torney-General v. Wilts. United Dairies Ltd.,0 the Court of Appeal examined
the broad emergency powers of executive control over food supplies.
Pursuant to legislative enactment, the executive was empowered to, inter
alia:
make orders regulating or giving directions with respect to the produc-
tion, manufacture, treatment, use, consumption, transport, storage, distribu-
tion, supply, sale or purchase of, or other dealing in or measures to be taken
in relation to any article... when it appears to him necessary or expedient
to make such order for the purpose of encouraging or maintaining the food
supply of the country.8 0
Under the purported exercise of this power, the executive, in the person of
the Food Controller, sought to secure a levy of two pennies per gallon on milk
prior to the grant of a license to any dairy. The Court of Appeal held that the
tax was improper since the legislation did not expressly provide for executive tax-
ing authority.8' In the opinion of Lord Justice Atkin:
[If] an officer of the executive seeks to justify a charge upon a subject made
for the use of the Crown ... he must show in clear terms, that Parliament
has authorized the particular charge.
8 2
The court asserted that, notwithstanding the condition of war, the executive
could not exclusively determine necessity, and, when such a measure eroded
fundamental liberty under the Bill of Rights8" the executive's case would be
strictly scrutinized and must be permitted in "clear terms."
75 [1918] 1 K.B. 33.
76 Id. at 39.
77 See aso dicta in Lipton Ltd. v. Ford, [1917] 2 K.B. 647 at 655.
78 See [1918] 1 K.B. at 41.
79 37 L.T.R. 884 (1921).
80 New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c.68, §§ 3 & 4; Defense of the Realm
(Consolidated) Regulations, Regulation 2F.
81 See 37 L.T.R. at 885 (Scrutton, L.J.).
82 Id. at 886.
83 1 Will. & Mar. Sess.2, c.2 (1688).
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This "clear terms" principle was also applied at this time by the Court of
Appeal to restrain the executive from controlling the rights of landlords in
Chester v. Bateson. 4 In this case the executive had sought to curtail the use of
ejectment proceedings by landlords against munitions workers unless prior min-
isterial consent had been obtained. 5 The landlord maintained that the im-
pugned regulation encroached upon the Magna Carta in that it deprived the
landlord of his right of access to the courts.8 6 It was held that such an encroach-
ment could only be by "direct enactment"8 7 which seemed to be a reformulation
of the clear terms principle, albeit in more restrictive terms.
Inevitably the limits of executive power in regard to property rights came
before the House of Lords and in Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel
Ltd.,"8 the court did not hesitate to balance executive necessity against funda-
mental liberty. In De Keyser the War Office informed the hoteliers that the
Army Council intended to take possession of their hotel, stipulating that ex gratia
compensation would be paid but would be "strictly limited to the actual monetary
loss sustained." 9 The Crown denied liability for full compensation by virtue of
prerogative right and emergency enabling legislation, which provided:
Any such regulation may provide for the suspension of any restrictions on
the acquisition or user of land or the exercise of the power of making by-
laws, or any other power under the Defense Acts, 1842 to 1875, or the
Military Land Acts, 1891 to 1903.90
The House of Lords held that the executive could not rely on the preroga-
tive to justify requisition since statutory powers had superceded executive prerog-
ative and, consequently, the prerogative was abated to the extent that the statute
was operative." Since the prerogative power had been limited by statute, it fell
to the court to determine whether it was for the executive or for the courts to
divine if, in fact, the statute "directly dealt" with the same subject matter. In
De Keyser the court opted for justiciability,9 2 notwithstanding its earlier but
recent decision against justiciability of other fundamental rights in Halliday.
Property rights were thus placed in a relatively advantageous position when set
against individual rights.
In defining the limits of emergency executive power and discretion, the
court forsook the opportunity to rearticulate the long-established constitutional
principles enshrined in the Magna Carta, Petition of Right, and Bill of Rights,
which protected citizens from the state acquisition of property without compen-
sation.9" Instead, the court relied upon a perceived "national sentiment" that
84 [1920] 1 K.B. 829.
85 Defense of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c.8, § 1(1), Regulation
2A(2).
86 25 Edw.I, 1927, c.29.
87 See [1920] 1 K.B. at 833.
88 [1920] A.C. 509. See also Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery
Co. Ltd., [1919] A.C. 744.
89 [1920] A.C. at 510.
90 See note 85, supra at § 1(2).
91 See [1920] A.C. at 561.
92 Id. at 559.
93 For a commentary on the historical significance of these constitutional provisions, see
F. MAITLAND, supra note 14.
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".. . it was equitable that burdens borne for the good of the nation" should be
evenly distributed." This activist stance resulted in the court departing from
constitutional principles while establishing a new constitutional doctrine which
Lord Sumner chose to call a presumption of interpretation:
The presumption must be, both that the executive action was taken under
powers by which it can be justified, rather than beyond all powers whatever,
and that the available powers have been exercised so as to prevent and not
so as to cause avoidable injury to the subject.9"
Although the grant of power had been extremely wide on its face the dis-
cretion of the executive in war was only unfettered insofar as the powers
executed the protective function of "public security and the defense of the realm"
and, significantly, the court limited the general words to the specific means pro-
vided and necessary to achieve those ends.9"
In De Keyser the general empowering words "for the suspension of any
restrictions" were narrowly construed so as "not to cause avoidable injury to the
subject." The power to acquire was deemed to be independent of the question of
payment and is completed and exhausted prior to the time at which the obliga-
tion to pay arose. Accordingly, this narrow construction meant that the obliga-
tion to pay compensation was not a "restriction" within the meaning of the Act
and could not, therefore, be suspended by the executive.97 In this result De
Keyser upheld the constitutional tradition of protecting private property from
expropriation. More significantly, the House of Lords formulated the De Keyser
Doctrine: that the courts, in the face of unfettered executive discretion via emer-
gency powers, reserve the right to scrutinize executive acts to ensure that they
are in fact necessary, and will limit the general words of an emergency statute to
the specific means provided and necessary for the task. Thus, the De Keyser
Doctrine established the justiciability of executive necessity in an emergency.
The De Keyser Doctrine may be distinguished from the Halliday-Liversidge-
McEldowney approach in that De Keyser and the other emergency property
rights cases dealt only with property rights and interests as opposed to internment
of suspects. Jurisprudentially, the key difference is found in the opposing ap-
proaches to the ultra vires doctrine. In De Keyser the House of Lords unequivo-
cally declared executive necessity in an emergency to be justiciable whereas in
Halliday such an approach was rejected when it was deemed that ". . . no
tribunal ... can be imagined less appropriate than a Court of Law" to examine
executive necessity.9" Indeed, the De Keyser doctrine follows the spirit of the dis-
sent in Halliday in which Lord Shaw declared that "fundamental rights [are]
. . .exempt from infringement by delegated power unless Parliament has ex-
pressed itself with unmistakable clarity."99 Thus while judicial activism has
ensured justiciability of property rights in emergencies, civil liberties have suffered
94 See [1920] A.C. at 553.
95 Id. at 559.
96 Id. at 529-30 (Lord Dunedin).
97 Id. at 558.
98 See [1917] A.G. at 269 (Lord Finlay, L.C.).
99 See generally [1917], A.C. 260.
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at the hands of a dearly discernible policy of judicial abnegation perpetuating
the problem aptly characterized by Neumann:
The state of siege, martial law, emergency powers-these merely indicate
that reasons of state may actually annihilate civil liberties altogether. Com-
mon to these institutions in most countries is the fact that the discretionary
power of those who declare an emergency cannot be challenged. It is they
who determine whether an emergency exists and what measures are deemed
necessary to cope with it.1"
The importance of the doctrine of necessity in the Northern Irish context is
readily apparent when it is recalled that the fifth statute enacted by the fledgling
Northern Irish Parliament (Stormont) was the notorious Special Powers Act of
192210. which remained in force for 50 years until it was replaced by modified,
yet equally repressive, British emergency legislation. 02
In recent years the British experience in Northern Ireland has inevitably
placed heavy reliance upon emergency executive powers to deal with the newer
and more complex problem of the urban guerilla. Because of these changes in
the social context, it is necessary to examine the judicial attitude to the terrorist
phenomenon in the light of the above doctrines. In fact only three cases are, for
our purposes, of doctrinal significance as they indicate a sub-category of the con-
cept of necessity, namely the doctrine of operation necessity.
In R. v. Allen... the Court of King's Bench Division of Ireland confronted
the issue of the justiciability of extremely repressive military action during a
period of martial law in Ireland. Although Allen has been regarded as a defin-
itive analysis of military and executive powers during martial law, the pleadings
of the military and the reasoning of Chief Justice Molony offer highly persuasive
authority concerning the parameters of executive discretion in dealing with
urban guerillas. In Allen the court declined jurisdiction to intervene so as to
prevent a military court from executing a person found in possession of arms.
The military argued, inter alia, that the court did not have jurisdiction and that
the exercise of martial law powers, durante bello, was not justiciable.' The key
issue in Allen was characterized by Chief Justice Molony to be: "What are the
powers of the Executive Government in dealing with armed insurrection?"'0 5
although the court was also prepared to examine whether, in fact, a state of war
existed justifying martial law.
After carefully reviewing the history of insurrection from the fourteenth
century, Molony noted that the traditional approach had been to use severe
repressive measures, including the suspension of habeas corpus, and to protect the
military and executive from judicial review post durante bello by the vehicle of
Indemnity Acts. The Chief Justice observed that none of these Acts had con-
templated either courts-martial or death sentences. However, Molony distin-
guished all prior armed insurrections on the factual basis that the then extant
100 Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, 53 COL. L. REv. 901, 917 (1953).
101 See note 1 supra.
102 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c.53.
103 [1921] 2 I.R. 241.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 244.
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insurrection consisted "exclusively of warfare of a guerilla character."'0 6 It was
noted that guerillas did not wear uniforms and often were ". . . posing as
peaceful citizens."'0 7 As long as guerilla warfare of this type continued, the
Chief Justice was of the opinion that ". . . the Government is entitled and,
indeed, bound to repel force by force, and thereby put down the insurrection and
restore public order."'0 8  Moreover, precedents which had emphasized the
justiciability of martial law powers "while the ordinary courts were still open"
were distinguished: "[It] may, however, be doubted whether they contemplated
such a system of guerilla warfare as now described."'0 9 The military derived both
its "sole justification and authority" from the existence of rebellion and also
".. . the duty of doing whatever may be necessary to quell it, and to restore peace
and order.""' The death sentence for possession of arms was, in the opinion of
the military and of the court, ". . . absolutely essential.""' The court, therefore,
accepted that which in modem parlance would be termed an argument of
"operational necessity." In essence guerilla warfare was deemed to create a
broader and more repressive category of necessity, namely operational necessity,
emanating from the military commander and beyond the oversight of both due
process of law and judicial review at an appellate level.
But if, in a guerilla war, the military can execute citizens via courts-martial
on the basis of operational necessity, a further issue remains as to other legal or
justiciable checks and balances or constraints placed upon the military during
an emergency, such as the current Northern Irish emergency, in which the
military and the executive are acting not under martial law but under sweeping
and repressive emergency legislation. Two further cases are of relevance in this
regard: R. v. Smith" and Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference
(No. 1 of 1975)."3
In Smith a soldier ordered a civilian to produce equipment promptly as
guerillas were known to be in the neighborhood. The civilian behaved in a
dilatory fashion and when the accused soldier reported this fact to his superior
officer, he was ordered to shoot the civilian if his dilatory demeanor did not
change. The soldier, noting the further delay of the civilian, shot and killed the
civilian and was later charged with murder. The soldier pleaded in defense that
he was following superior orders. In this case it was admitted that the killing was
deliberate and intentional and, therefore, the only issue for the court was whether
or not the defense of obedience to orders made the killing justifiable homicide or
murder. In acquitting the soldier of the charge the court declared that a soldier
is not culpable if he, subjectively, believes he is obeying the commands of a
superior and the order given is not "manifestly illegal" so that he ought to have
known it to be unlawful."' These twofold subjective and objective criteria
enabled the court to sidestep 'the more thorny issue presented by the defense,
106 Id. at 268.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 252.
109 Id. at 270.
110 Id. at 271.
111 Id. at 272.
112 17 CAPE OF GOOD HOPE Sup. CT. REP. 561 (1900).
113 [1976] 3 W.L.R. 235 (H.L.).
114 See 17 CAPE OF GooD HoPE Sup. CT. REP. at 563.
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namely that in a period of guerilla warfare when guerillas were thought to be
proximate ". . . the order was not altogether an unreasonable or unnecessary
one.""'  While the court said that "there is a good deal to be said in favor" of
this defense contention," 6 it seems clear from the facts and the context of the
case that the circumstances of guerilla warfare could well have determined the
issue of lawfulness of the order had the question been reached. The problem
remains, however, of determining, after the Smith ruling, just what, if any,
superior orders are of a type as to be clearly illegal.
This dilemma has been posed by a leading constitutional text:
There is really no satisfactory authority on the point. On the one hand,
the citizen should not be subject to acts of tyranny at the hands of one who
cannot be made responsible: on the other hand, every argument against
allowing the courts to interfere with the course of military operations weighs
equally heavily against submitting every one of the Commander-in-Chief's
acts to be judged by a common jury. These are matters for experts.
1 1
Clearly the balancing of such "acts of tyranny" against operational necessity should
speak strongly in favor of justiciability so as to provide impartial scrutiny. The
impartiality of experts, presumably those trained in military expertise, is, it is sub-
mitted, highly questionable and, prima facie unlikely to provide the high degree
of skepticism which would be appropriate in a liberal democratic system. Indeed
the recent anti-guerilla operations in, for example, Vietnam and Northern Ire-
land, have sometimes revealed military experts to be deficient in matters of judg-
ment involving the balancing of liberty against operational necessity.
The concept of operational necessity was recently before the House of Lords
in Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference."' In this case a British
soldier shot and killed an unarmed civilian whom, it was alleged, he honestly
though mistakenly suspected of being a member of the I.R.A. The soldier had
apparently ordered the deceased to halt and when he did not do so, he killed him.
A judge, sitting without a jury, acquitted the soldier on the grounds that he had
had no conscious intent to kill and that the killing was justifiable homicide.
Perhaps in response to the great public outcry generated by this verdict, the At-
torney General for Northern Ireland took the unusual step of appealing by way
of a Reference via the Northern Irish Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. In
the House of Lords the decision turned upon the jurisdictional point of whether
the court could entertain the reference application and it was decided that juris-
diction would be assumed." 9 However, it was further reasoned that the issue of
criminal liability of the honest but mistaken belief of the soldier in killing the
suspect was so framed that it did not raise a point of law but rather a question of
fact and, as such, the court declined to review the matter."'
The second question as to the nature of the killing was, therefore, not
115 Id. at 564.
116 Id.
117 D. KEIR & F. LAWSON, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437 (4th ed. 1954).
118 See [1976] 3 W.L.R. 235.
119 For jurisdictional reasoning see Id. at 238-41 (Lord Diplock).
120 Id. at 248 & 256-57.
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reached.12 ' Although the House of Lords continued its policy of judicial abnega-
tion, it is clear from the obiter in the reasoning that the conditions of guerilla
warfare weighed heavily in the minds of the judges. According to Lord Diplock
the question of the guilt of the soldier would depend upon the circumstances in
which the accused made his decision to use force and the amount of time avail-
able for such a decision.' 22 Lord Diplock then hypothesized that an escaping
suspect could be attempting to join a band of armed terrorists who "might be
lurking in the neighborhood" and, consequently, as the time for the decision to
shoot was short "even a reasonable man could only act intuitively."'2 3  Thus, he
continued, a court would have to balance "risk against risk" with the caveat that
"the calm analytical atmosphere of a court-room" with the "benefit of hindsight"
might be inappropriate if it was not recalled that the soldier's decision was made
"but in the brief second or two" and "under all of the stresses to which he was
exposed."' 24
Lord Diplock concurred with the finding of fact by the trial judge that the
soldier "may have acted intuitively or instinctively without foreseeing the likely
consequences of his act [beyond preventing escape]."' 25 In the circumstances the
soldier had no choice as to the degree of force because shooting the suspect was
the only means of preventing his escape. Consequently, arguments regarding the
degree of force in self-defense were inapplicable. 6
At trial the judge found that the soldier had fired because he believed that
the man who was seeking to escape might be a terrorist. 7 The reasonableness of
the action would depend upon the circumstances and the trial judge took the view
that mere failure to halt would not, per se, be sufficient grounds for using a
rifle. 2 ' Clearly all courts in this case took the view implicitly that the circum-
stances extant in Northern Ireland are most unusual in that the possible proximity
of armed guerillas mitigated the harshness of the soldier's actions:
[I]t would be open to the jury to take the view that it would not be unreason-
able to assess the kind of harm to be averted by preventing the accused's
escape as even graver-the killing or wounding of members of the patrol by
terrorists in ambush, and the effect of this success by members of the
Provisional I.R.A. in encouraging the continuance of armed insurrection and
all the misery and destruction of life and property that terrorist activity in
Northern Ireland has entailed. 29
121 The Attorney-General indicated that it was his hope that this reference would lead to
some :general guidance being given as to the use of force. I regret that I do not see that that
is possible, particularly as we are asked to give our opinion on the particular circumstances
stated in the reference which may not be repeated. Id. at 257 (Viscount Dilhorne).
122 [A]re we satisfied that no reasonable man (a) with knowledge of such facts as
were known to the accused or reasonably believed by him to exist, (b) in the circum-
stances of the time available to him for reflection, (c) could be of the opinion that the
prevention of the risk of harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were
allowed to escape justified exposing the *suspect to the risk of harm to him that might
result from the kind of force that the accused contemplated using? Id. at 246 (Lord
Diplock).
123 Id. at 247.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 248.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 244, 255-56.
128 Id. at 255-56.
129 Id. at 247 (Lord Diplock).
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A major difficulty presented by such reasoning is that, as the I.R.A. does not
wear uniform, almost any citizen might be a member. Moreover, the proximity
of terrorist activities as a major circumstance to be considered would, in the case
of Northern Ireland, include vast geographic areas, some of which have a high
population density. In other words, the reasonableness criteria of remote and un-
substantiated suspicion of terrorist involvement coupled with the geographic
proximity of hostile areas put almost one-third of the population at risk and are
an inadequate restraint upon the conduct of the armed forces against the unarmed
civilian population. The result of the decision in this case and the dicta of the
House of Lords are that killing unarmed civilians erroneously suspected of being
guerillas may be justifiable homicide. This serves to show both the strains placed
on the notion of emergency executive powers by the concept of operational
necessity, and the failure of even modern courts to attempt to circumscribe the
military or the executive during an emergency.
Thus the unwillingness of the courts to define the parameters of executive
power over civil liberty in emergency situations, coupled with the inability to
establish criteria other than operational necessity for military action in emer-
gencies, necessitates a close scrutiny of military theory, if not tactics, currently
applied to urban guerilla warfare. To what extent does this counter-insurgency
theory, which provides the theoretical underpinning of the doctrine of operational
necessity, respect or diminish civil liberties? Should the failure of the courts to
advance criteria for the protection of liberty in emergencies and their reluctance
to examine military and executive encroachment of fundamental personal rights
be a major cause for concern?
III. Theories of Counter-Insurgency and the Common Law
During the last thirty years, since the end of World War II, the world has
witnessed the growth and development of terrorism or guerilla warfare by revolu-
tionary groups in various jurisdictions. A common feature is that the revolu-
tionaries have often been indigenous, irregular soldiers utilizing stealth to attack
civilian and military targets within the State, as opposed to fighting an openly
declared interstate war as envisaged by the Geneva Convention."' This type
of revolutionary warfare relies heavily upon assassination, bombing, intimidation
and significant support from sections of the population."' Consequently, the task
of the military and the police in suppressing and containing guerilla warfare is
extremely difficult for several reasons, not the least of which is that most standing
armies have been trained and equipped to deal with external threats by other
states, i.e., conventional warfare. This fact, when coupled with the inherent
problem of fighting an indigenous enemy which is immediately reabsorbed into
the population, makes counter-insurgency action a demanding task. In recent
years new theories, strategies, and technology have been developed and utilized
130 For an interesting analysis of the limits of the Geneva Conventions, the position of urban
guerillas and the doctrine of necessity, see T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMER-
kCAN TRAGEDY (1970).
131 An informative discussion of the modem terrorist phenomenon is found in: R. CLUT-
TERBUCK, GUERILLAS AND TERRORISTS (1977).
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by most nations faced with "internal subversion" in the form of guerilla warfare
with varying degrees of success and failure.' 32
Inevitably, the role of military theory is of crucial importance in determining
both the attitude and the response of the State to internal subversion in that it ac-
counts for any shifts in the concept of operational necessity. It is facile to examine
the particular strategies and technology employed by the military in guerilla situ-
ations without first examining the theoretical premises upon which such strategies
and tactics are based. In this connection a close examination of military theory
and its implications for legal theory in Northern Ireland is particularly appropri-
ate as, not only is the United Kingdom a liberal democracy, but also a modem
civilized industrial state. Therefore, by looking closely at the evolution and
development of socio-legal and theoretical norms in Northern Ireland during the
current emergency, it may be possible to examine the fundamental implications
for law and legal systems presented by the current theories of counter-insurgency.
This section will attempt briefly to outline the current guerilla theories and
the counter-insurgency theory as developed and used in Northern Ireland. By
outlining and elucidating the two opposing strategies, it is possible to obtain a
deeper understanding of the changing role of law and legal systems in emergency
situations short of martial law and to facilitate meaningful criticism of the justifi-
cations advanced for extreme measures.
The British military interest in guerilla warfare and counter-insurgency
tactics emanates from the British experience in Ireland during the period from
1919 to 1921. During that time, the British army together with the police con-
stituted over 80,000 men, and yet they were unable to maintain law and order
during martial law. In particular, the urban environment became increasingly
difficult to control in terms of security and for all other political purposes. It is
now known that the guerillas during this phase (the I.R.A.) never numbered
more than 3,000, of whom very few could be considered to be activists."
Nevertheless it was clear to British planners and strategists that, despite the gov-;
ernment's overwhelming superiority, the guerillas had effectively made Ireland
impossible to govern. The British withdrawal from the south of Ireland in 1921
constituted a victory for the guerillas because they had achieved their objective
in demonstrating that the colonial power was unable to effectiuely govern.
134
This lesson was not lost on British military theorists, who between 1921 and
the Second World War developed techniques for countering guerilla activities
(insurgencies). As a result, various amendments were made to Field Service
Regulations by the outbreak of the Second World War.3 ' By 1940, for example,
132 On the role of science, innovation and technology, see C. ACXROYD, K. MARGOLIS, J.
ROSENHEAD, & T. SHALLICE, THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL 151-286 (1977).
133 R. TABER, THE WAR OF THE FLEA: GUERILLA WARFARE THEORY AND PRACTICE 110
(1965).
134 The shift in emphasis in guerilla tactics from direct confrontation in the classical sense
to indirect terror, the aim of which is to demonstrate the failure of a government to govern
effectively, is a crucial change in the tactics of terrorism. Most contemporary guerilla groups
cannot hope to win a direct confrontation and, therefore, concentrate on demonstrating the
ineffectiveness of government. If successful this achieves, inter alia, a diminution of public
social confidence in law and deleteriously affects social solidarity within the state. For an
examination of indirect terror, see E. HYAMS, TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM 9, 10-11 (1975).




the British army had established a Special Operations Executive under which
agents were placed behind enemy lines and the training of these agents was
based upon the lessons learned from Ireland in 1921 .'3 British military pub-
lications of that date emphasized the need for a friendly population which was
deemed to be necessary to protect both the identity and the operations of gueril-
las. Other publications outlined the technique and strategy of assassinations and
the use of explosives."'
The use of guerillas in German-Occupied Europe is generally regarded to
have been a success, but immediately after the cessation of hostilities in 1945,
Britain itself, as a colonial power, was faced with a growing number of guerilla
movements against British interests throughout the world. Most notable among
these was the outbreak of guerilla violence in Palestine immediately after the
Second World War and the outbreak of guerilla hostilities in Malaya and Kenya
during the early 1950's.
These revolutionary situations enabled the British to develop further strat-
egies for countering guerilla activity.' By the 1960's military strategists had
begun to look for a theory which would explain both the role of the army in the
counter-revolutionary situation and the role of guerilla. Three military theoreti-
cians have played predominant roles in the development of contemporary military
theory. In particular, the writings of Lieutenant Colonel John J. McCuen (U.S.
Army) in his book The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War" 9 and the British
theorist Sir Robert Thompson paved the way for the current contemporary the-
oretical model of Brigadier Frank Kitson which was propagated in his influential
book Low Intensity Operations.'
McCuen divides revolutionary war into four phases: (1) the period of
organization (subversion); (2) the period of terrorism (and to a certain extent
small-scale guerilla warfare); (3) the period of guerilla warfare; (4) finally,
the period of mobile warfare.
14 '
It is clear that McCuen bases his propositions upon the fact that revolution-
aries have to start from virtually nothing. Essentially, McCuen's view is athe-
oretical and seems to regard guerillas as a modern form of "mindless gangster"
operating without a cause or socio-political motivation. If guerillas are viewed
as merely power-hungry individuals, then McCuen's theoretical model has a
high degree of validity. If, on the other hand, guerillas have a clearly discernible
political reason and motivation for taking up arms within a state, then McCuen's
four-stage model is suspect. In the Irish. context its validity is doubtful because of
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Moreover, all of the development in strategy and tactics by military planners in Pales-
tine, Kenya and other colonies has been wholly based upon the insight derived from the
British experience in Ireland in 1921, in that it is essential to recognize that guerillas cannot
function without the support of a sympathetic or friendly population. The British colonial
wars, in countries such as Aden, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Palestine and Ireland have contrib-
uted to the steady development of military technique and tactics; sometimes based upon ad hoc
considerations which were seen to be necessary in the particular circumstances and at other
times based upon new developments in theory and politics.
139 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MCCUEN].
140 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KITSON]. After writing this book (and serving in Northern
Ireland), Kitson was promoted and put in command of the British Infantry Training School.
141 See McCUEN, supra note 139, passim.
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the strong irredentist reaction of the minority population to the partitioning of
Ireland which excluded the six northeastern counties from independence.
Perhaps the McCuen model was unduly influenced by the events in Cuba
during the Castro rebellion. It was because of the success of the Castro guerillas
that the so-called "Foco theory" of guerilla warfare gained acceptance.'42 Ac-
cording to this theory, it is not necessary to organize the population as a prelude
to revolt. Foco theorists claim that a small group operating from a remote area
could act as a focus of discontent in the country as a whole.'4 3 This theory runs
essentially counter to the theory of Mao Tse-tung in that Mao laid emphasis on
the fact that a population must be highly organized before a resort to arms.'"
When set against Mao's theory of guerilla warfare and Lenin's concept of objective
and subjective revolutionary criteria,' the Foco theory in its pure form appears
more akin to anarchism than a socialist or communist revolutionary theory. More-
over, neither the Foco theory nor McCuen's analysis emphasize or understand the
fact that most forms of successful guerilla warfare have been predicated upon
the common factor of existing discontent among the population in general, mak-
ing the guerillas' cause socially and politically acceptable to the populace. It is
clear that McCuen regarded his role as merely that of a tactician in the military
sense and divorced himself from questions of social context when preparing his
analysis. Thus McCuen's models, so carefully drawn in military terms, must be
used with extreme caution in the context of urban guerilla warfare in a modem
society.
142 For a full explanation and analysis of the "foco theory," see G. FAIRBAIRN, REVOLU-
TIONARY GUERILLA WARFARE: THE COUNTRYSIDE VERSION (1974).
143 For the failure of this theory as used by Che Guevara in Bolivia, see Id. at 270-78.
144 Id. at 98-114.
145 V. LENIN, THE WAR AND THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL 13 '(International Publishers ed.
1932):
For a Marxist there is no doubt that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary
situation; furthermore we know that not every revolutionary situation leads to revolu-
tion. What are, generally speaking the characteristics of a revolutionary situation? We
can hardly be mistaken when we indicate the following three outstanding signs: (1)
it is impossible for the ruling class to maintain their power unchanged; for there is
a crisis "higher up," taking one form or another; there is a crisis in the policy of the
ruling class; as a result there appears a crack through which the dissatisfaction and
the revolt of the oppressed classes burst forth. If a revolution is to take place it is
usually insufficient that "one does not wish down below," but it is necessary that
"one is incapable up above" to continue in the old way; (2) the wants and sufferings
of the oppressed classes become more acute than usual; (3) in consequence of the
above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses who in
"peace time" allow themselves to be robbed without protest, but in stormy times are
drawn both by the circumstances of the crisis and by the "higher-ups" themselves
into independent historic action.
Without these objective changes, which are independent not only of the will of
separate groups and parties but even of separate classes, a revolution as a rule is
impossible. The co-existence of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary
situation. (Emphasis supplied.)
And, after analyzing the failure of prior Russian and German revolutions, he concluded:
[Bjecause a revolution emerges not out of every revolutionary situation, but out of
such situations where, to the above-mentioned objective changes, subjective ones are
added, namely the ability of the revolutionary classes to carry out revolutionary mass
actions strong enough to break (or to undermine) the old government, it being
the rule that never, not even in a period of crises, does a government "fall" of itself
without being "helped to fall." (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 13-14. See also, GUERILLA WARFARE AND MARXISM (W. Pomeroy ed. 1969).
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The current British theories of counter-insurgency are largely to be found in
the writings of Sir Robert Thompson14 and Brigadier Frank Kitson. The
Thompson-Kitson approach emphasizes military intelligence as the key to any
military theory dealing with guerilla warfare. The approach clearly assumes that
guerillas cannot function effectively without the support of a friendly population
and the resulting counter-insurgency theory and tactics revolve around breaking
the relationship between the guerilla and the friendly population. Thompson
establishes five basic principles which must be followed and within which all gov-
ernment measures must fall.' 7 Thompson's first principle is that the government
must have a clear political aim. He argues that civil courts must be allowed to
function during a period of emergencies, but emphasizes that emergency laws can
be passed to enable counter-insurgency to proceed while the civil courts are
open.'48 He envisages the normal judicial process being amended and changed
through changes in laws of procedure and evidence so that a government can
pass very tough repressive laws. The only limitation on governmental discretion,
which Thompson refers to as a "golden rule," should be that each new law must
be fairly and firmly applied.'49 It is clear that by fair application of repressive
emergency laws Thompson envisages that emergency powers should be applied
equally to all the population. Within his concept of emergency laws Thompson
lists, inter alia, laws imposing curfews, mandatory death penalties for carrying
arms, life imprisonment for providing supplies to terrorists, restricted residence,
detention without trial for suspected terrorist supporters, and judicially sanc-
tioned preventive detention by use of "a tribunal presided over by a judge which
advises the government."'5 0 In other words, Thompson's first principle is that the
government must have a political aim and objective and must not shrink from
passing repressive emergency laws which must be applied equally to all in-
habitants-a principle which may be termed the "equality of repression" prin-
ciple.
The second principle offered by Thompson is that the government must
function in accordance with the law, albeit draconian law. Thompson explicitly
regards governments as recipients of harsh measures as well as the repository of
them. 5 ' He argues that it is not only morally wrong for a government to be
above the law but that it creates practical difficulties which will present insuper-
able problems. The third principle is that the government must have an overall
plan.' 5 ' By this Thompson means that the plan must cover not just military-
security measures but also political, social, economic, administrative, police and
other matters which may have a bearing on insurgency. Implicit in this point is
that the military should be involved to an intimate degree in civilian government
146 R. THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY; THE LESSONS OF MALAYA AND
VIETNAM (1966). Thompson is the author of several books on insurgency and is a leading
international strategist. He was recently a Presidential Advisor to President Nixon on the
Vietnam war, a rare distinction for a retired British officer.
147 Id. at 50.
148 Id. at 50-52.
149 Id. at 53.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 53-54.
152 Id. at 55.
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and political strategy--a concept of "total strategy."'5 3 The fourth principle is
that the government must give priority to defeating political subversion as op-
posed to merely defeating political guerillas.' It is in this context that
Thompson makes the insight that all governmental operations should be designed
to break the contact between the guerilla unit and subversive political organiza-
tions. In this way Thompson believes that guerillas can be cut off from their
sources of supply. s The fifth principle envisaged by Thompson is that, in the
guerilla phase of insurgency, a government must secure its base area. Such a view
entails the virtual surrender of large remoter areas of the country and its popula-
tion to the guerillas in the initial stages of counter-insurgency operations.'56
Although Thompson's theories are vague on some points it is clear that,
because of his success in defeating communist insurgency in Malaya, his tactics
and strategy have been held in high regard by British and American theorists.
The problem is, however, that Thompson pays little regard to the causes of
unrest other than by enunciating a principle that the government must not be
corrupt. Thus the social-economic or political causes of unrest are not deeply
examined and merely relegated to a position whereby a government must pay
attention to some of the more apparent effects without imposing the obligation
of analyzing in any depth the real or underlying causes of unrest. Thus
Thompson can be faulted for being apolitical and non-theoretical in his approach
to defeating insurgency. 57
Kitson's book, Low Intensity Operations, was written in 1971 after Kitson
had been able to study closely the operations of the British army in Northern
Ireland.' The book is important, therefore, because it emphasizes the role of
counter-insurgency measures in the context of the modern urban guerilla. Much
of the writing which had been used hitherto in counter-insurgency theory by
military planners and strategists had been in response to Mao Tse-tung's theory
of rural guerilla warfare, whereas Kitson's book establishes various insights into
breaking the relationship between the guerillas and the friendly population in an
153 For a full explanation of the total strategy concept, see C. BARNETT, STRATEGY AND
SocIETY '(1974). The total strategy concept would appear to be difficult to publicly achieve
in a democratic state in which the separation of powers doctrine is operative.
154 See THompsoN, supra note 146, at 55-57.
155 A disturbing feature of the Thompson-Kitson approach and, indeed, all modern
military theorists, is the blurring of the distinction between lawful protest, civil disobedience
and subversion (including treason). See KITSON, supra note 140, at 82-83. Subversion is
never defined but is described as including lawful protest. The military panacea is close
surveillance of protest groups as they are described as a form of incipient terrorists in a
preliminary (subversive) stat7. See KITSON, supra at ch. 2, ch. 5. Given this basic failure to
define subversion and to distinguish it from lawful protest, the recent revelations in the United
States regarding sustained and illegal surveillance of political groups is comprehensible, albeit
reprehensible. See C. PERKUS, COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1975). It is, however, deeply significant that no British or American mi!itary
theorist has felt the necessity or obligation to define "subversion," a term which is freely used
in delimiting the concept of surveillance and counter-insurgency theory and practice.
156 See THOMPSON, supra note 146, at 57-58.
157 Of course Thompson was primarily concerned with defeating communist insurgency
and not with other forms of urban guerilla violence which have come to the fore since his book
was written.
158 Kitson undertook the writing of his book after he had commanded a brigade in Belfast
for a year. Kitson also had actively participated in counter-insurgency operations in Kenya in the
1950's. See also F. KITSON, BUNCH OF Five (1977). Kitson can be fairly described as the
most highly qualified counter-insurgency theorist in the British Army.
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urban environment and as such is worthy of close scrutiny.159
Like Thompson, Kitson emphasizes the overriding importance of intel-
ligence gathering in dealing with guerilla unrest. While the Kitson approach is
as politically unsophisticated as Thompson's, it does place emphasis on the fact
that a joint military civilian command is necessary at the very highest level of
government and he sees the army's role under three headings: first, advisory to
the extent of deciding between defensive and offensive roles; second, the army may
contribute towards organizing the population; and third, the collection of "back-
ground information" which the army can then develop into what is termed
"contact information."' 6 ° This third aspect, the collecting of background in-
formation, is crucial to the Kitson thesis. Basically it entails the collection and
evaluation of what is termed "low level intelligence."'' By this is meant intel-
ligence information which will not of itself be of very great importance but which,
when collated and taken together, may form the basis for further inquiry. Kitson
explicitly envisages intelligence organizations working together to collect informa-
tion through informers, agents, and the interrogation of prisoners but does not
preclude other "special operations" which may be necessary in the situation.'62
Briefly stated, Kitson's theory is that there are two separate functions in-
volved in countering guerilla activities. The military commander must first of
all establish an intelligence organization capable of producing background in-
formation or low level intelligence which is then fed to operational commanders
who develop this information into "contact information" so that guerillas can
be militarily engaged. The key to Kitson's theory, however, lies in its implemen-
tation. The intelligence network is not viewed as being separate from the counter-
insurgency force itself. Rather, the collection of data is in fact conducted by the
commanders in the field who also have the responsibility for establishing and
maintaining contact with the guerillas. It is this unified command structure
which has been tested in Northern Ireland.' 6'
Kitson is intriguingly vague in his explanation of how intelligence is in fact
gathered. He lays emphasis on the capture of prisoners who are then "persuaded"
to talk and, if possible, converted into informers.' But, as Kitson points out, the
principal problem in fighting guerillas lies in establishing contact with them and
the process of developing low level intelligence information into contact informa-
tion he describes as "the basic tactical function of counter-insurgency opera-
tions."' 65 To develop background information, Kitson emphasizes that part of
159 KITSON, supra note 140, at 85-89.
160 Id. at ch. 6.
161 Id. at 103-107.
162 Id. at 122-26, 191-96.
163 However, implicit in this new devolved or delegated military structure is the belief
that commanders in the field be permitted to act speedily and on their own initiative. Thus,"operational necessity" decisions are delegated to low-ranking officers in the field which may
help to explain the continuing patterns of brutality on a widespread basis in Northern Ireland.
164 KITSON. supra note 140, at 119-22.
165 Id. at 99. While envisaging that the developing of background information into con-
tact information falls upon normal military units he notes that special skills are required for
exploiting the characteristics of captured insurgents, and it is clear from the language used by
Kitson that he sees a role for Special Forces, such as the Special Air Service (SAS) or Rangers.
Moreover Kitson's training leads him to deduce that a special operations unit attached to
normal infantry units might involve an elaborate operation of building up pseudo-gangs out of
captured insurgents who are, in some way, persuaded to work the counter-insurgency forces.
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the approach is to regain a measure of control over the population and subse-
quently to develop low level information into the type of information necessary
for making contact with armed groups.'
Kitson points out that four facets of counter-insurgency tactics might be
used either singly or together. In this connection he envisages the concentration
into villages of those people lying in scattered and remote areas of the country-
side. This is reminiscent of both the concentration camp concept or, to use the
modem euphemism, the strategic hamlet." 7 He also advocates a government role
in psychological warfare by the dissemination of information which is carefully
controlled and tailored to meet the military-security situation.ss Another facet
is the development of a census by which basic data can be collected from all the
population, both hostile and non-hostile,"6 9 and Kitson favors the use of identity
cards for each individual to implement this. But it is clear from Kitson's
examples that he envisages the use of very detailed and basic information about
the target group, such as the financial stability of inhabitants of the community,
and any immediate change in their circumstances, so as to be able to identify
even minor changes in the social relationships within a community which may
indicate the presence of outside income or resources.
Interestingly, in one of his examples, Kitson notes that after a degree of
background information has in fact been gathered it may be necessary to utilize
what he terms "shock treatment' 7 0 whereby, having established a change in
financial circumstances of a particular inhabitant of a community, the military
commander may then decide "to interrogate four of the people who, from his
investigations, seem least likely to be supporting [the communists].""' Thus
Kitson proposes the arrest of innocent people with a view to interrogation merely
to establish low level intelligence. Moreover, within this scenario the army is
seen as persuading each of the four innocent people to help to gather and cor-
roborate information of this type. As he points out "in fact no one need know
that any information has been given,"'7 and envisages the army as prosecuting a
(There is some evidence that Ihis approach was used in Algeria, Kenya, Cyprus and, more
recently, in the United States.) See M. OPPENHEIM, THE URBAN GUERILLA at 62 (1970).
166 KiTsoN, supra note 140, at 106.
167 Id. at 107.
168 Id. On the role of the press in Northern Ireland see E. McCANN, THE BRITIsH FREss
IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1972); J. McGuFFIN, INTERNMENT ch. 15 (1973). On self-censor-
ship of the press see S. WINCHESTER, IN HOLY TERROR (1975). Fisk, British Clamp on Northern
Ireland Propaganda, Irish Times (Dublin) Mar. 25, 1975, at 6, col. 5; O'Clery, Psychological
Warfare Training Given to 262 Civil Servants, Irish Times (Dublin), Oct. 28, 1976, at 5, col.
1; McHardy, Black Propaganda Stopped, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Mar. 6, 1977, at 5, col.
4; Blundy, The Army's Secret War in Northern Ireland, Sunday Times (London), Mar. 13,
1977, at 6, col. 3. This overt and covert abuse of freedom of expression has played a significant
role in ensuring a lack of informed, skeptical public scrutiny of events in Northern Ireland. As
noted above, judicial review durante bello is absent because of the policy of judicial abn gation
and, therefore, the normal checks and balances of public opinion in a democracy skeptical of ex-
ecutive use and abuse of power is of special importance. The manipulation of the media advo-
cated by Kitson, and the distortion of information which has recently been admitted to have
been practiced for the past five years in Northern Ireland are a serious breach of the principle of
freedom of expression.
169 KaTSON, supra note 140. It should be noted that at common law, there is no estab-
lished right to privacy.
170 Id. at 109.




case against the innocent individuals so that a small fine is exacted for the offense
for which they had ostensibly been arrested. In this way intelligence information
is consolidated. The moral and legal questions regarding the interrogation and
punishment of innocent people apparently do not concern the author."'
Other forms of interrogation are also noted by Kitson in that he proposes
informal talks with captured guerillas so as to persuade them to talk but also less
informal talks with captured insurgents." 4 In a later example Kitson does not
explain how captured insurgents are to be persuaded to talk and to help the
military authorities. However, it is clear, if only by omission, that "unusual"
measures are contemplated."' s
Kitson does not differentiate between rural and urban terrorists. Rather,
he asserts that the "important weakness" of both groups is that the actions of
guerillas must be related to a particular purpose which in turn involves: (1)
building up some degree of support among the population; and (2) at the same
time causing the population to act in accordance with the program designed to
achieve the aims of those running the political subversion campaign .' There
must, therefore, be a point of contact between the guerillas and the political
leaders controlling the subversive organization.
Kitson's scenario for gathering and developing low level intelligence into
contact information is thought to be applicable in both rural and urban settings
because of this central weakness in guerilla strategy. Thus, he envisages that
when sufficient degrees of low level intelligence information have been gathered
and a degree of background information on the target community collated, then
various techniques can be used to develop such information. 7  For example,
special operations can then be directed towards target groups and road blocks
and checking of vehicles or searching of buildings can be conducted on a large
scale. 7 But, as Kitson is quick to point out, this system for developing back-
ground information can only work if there is a good deal of information to
develop. That is to say it is not as important that such information is reliable but
173 On the theory of telishing, that is, the punishment of innocent people, see Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, [1955] PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3; and H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILITY I1 et seq. (1968).
174 KITSON, supra note 140, at 119.
175 Id. at 122. Two British investigations have acknowledged the ill-treatment of suspected
I.R.A. terrorists in Northern Ireland. See Report of the Enquiry into Allegations Against the
Security Forces of Physical Brutality in Northern Ireland Arising out of Events on the 9th
August 1971, CMND. 4823 (1972) and Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Ap-
pointed to Consider Authorized Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Suspected of
Terrorism, CMNID. 4901 (1972). See Lowry, Ill-Treatment, Brutality and Torture: Some
Thoughts upon the Treatment of Irish Political Prisoners, 22 DE PAUL L. R-v. 553 (1973). Re-
cently the European Commission of Human Rights made a finding of torture against the
British in Northern Ireland and the matter has now been referred for adjudication to the
European Court of Human Rights. See Report of the Eurotpean Commission of Human Rights:
Ireland v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71 (1976).
176 KITsoN, supra note 140, at 127.
177 For the past three years low-level intelligence, that is, information gathered against
suspects, terrorists and citizens at large, has been stored on a central computer facility at the
British Army Headquarters, to which military patrols have immediate radio access. It must be
emphasized that such accumulated, and often irrelevant, trivia is insufficient to form probable
cause for a search or arrest warrant at common law. On the computerization process, see Fisk,
Army's computer has data on half of population in Ulster, The Times (London), Dec. 5, 1974,
at 1, col. 7; and ACKROYD et al., supra note 132, at 41-42.
178 KITSON, supra note 140, at 130.
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that there is a sufficient quantum of it so as to develop a full community profile." 9
Kitson is also far more subtle in his approach to the political aspects of
counter-insurgency matters than previous theorists. He sees conditional con-
cessions in a political sense being given by the government to moderate or passive
supporters of the subversive organization. Such concessions are to have the effect
of separating the more moderate supporters of protest from the hard core of
subversives.8 Essentially, Kitson 'would not shrink from co-opting such mod-
erates into the government. Thus, Kitson sees a role in splitting the moderate
support from the hard core support so as to effectively utilize a political manipu-
lative "carrot and stick" campaign whereby reforms are conceded to the mod-
erates while at the same time hard core dissent is repressed in counter-insurgency
fashion.
181
According to Thompson's first principle the government under attack must
be seen to be fair and at least not corrupt, whereas Kitson develops the "total
strategy" concept whereby concessions are made to elements of the insurgent
group in such a way that moderate support is alienated from the insurgents.
A major question arises as to the role of the legal system in such an arrange-
ment. Thompson explicitly argues that law should play a vital role in that, by
statute, emergency laws can be simplified so as to insure that tough repressive
laws are applied equally among the population. Clearly Thompson does not en-
visage due process in any accepted sense of the term, but rather a manipulation of
the substantive law and procedural changes so that the appearance of fair and
evenhanded justice is maintained while severe repression is implemented. Kitson,
on the other hand, regards the role of law in a more sophisticated light in that he
sees two possible uses for the law. On the one hand, law can be "just another
weapon in the government's arsenal" and in such a case the law provides little
more than a "propaganda cover" for the disposal of unwanted members of the
public.'82 However, for this to happen the legal system must be discreetly tied
into the system of government, and the judiciary, in effect, must be controlled by
the supreme military-civilian command.
Kitson's second alternative is that the law should remain impartial and
administer the laws of the country without any direction from the government.'
Moreover, Kitson, like Thompson, admits that such a government can introduce
179 However, it is clear that the military concept of relevance differs from the legal; for
example, Fisk, supra note 177, notes that the Army computer stores such information as the
color of furnishings in the homes of people they regard as political activists.
180 KITsoN, supra note 140, at 82.
181 Id. at 87:
Although with an eye to world opinion and to the need to retain the allegiance of
the people, no more force than is necessary for containing the situation should be
used, conditions can be made reasonably uncomfortable for the population as a
whole, in order to provide an incentive for a return to normal life and to act as a
deterrent towards a resumption of the campaign.
Thus "necessary" force would here encompass the notion of deterrence which was expressed
somewhat more concretely by a serving Army officer: "You know when we were in Bally-
murphy [a Belfast Catholic ghetto], we had the people really fed up with us, terrified really.
I understand what the refugees must feel like in Vietnam ... after every shooting incident we
would order 1,500 house searches-1,500." Quoted in C. ACxCROYD et al., supra note 132,
at 38.




very repressive legislation to deal with subversion which the law and the legal
system can administer. But he questions the resulting situation because there is
a danger that the legal system and its law officers might not recognize any differ-
ence between the forces of the government and that of the enemy. As a con-
sequence, any violation of the law from whatever quarter would be treated in
the same way.' Notwithstanding this problem Kitson prefers the second alter-
native, because he deems it to be both morally right and also expedient because
it will help to maintain the allegiance of the population. Kitson does, however,
recognize that the second alternative may impose unacceptable delays upon the
efficiency of military operations and thus such a system might prove to be "un-
workable."' 85
Thus, both Thompson and Kitson regard law and the legal system merely
as weapons in the armory of the government, and view the legal system and its
law officers in a highly manipulative light. In the Northern Ireland context, the
manipulation of law has followed the method advocated by Thompson in that
the judicial system has been drastically affected by both substantive provisions
passed so as to legitimate, ex post facta, repressive emergency powers,"8 and by
procedural or systematic alterations which have, for example, abolished jury
trials, imposed reverse onus upon the accused regarding the admissibility of
zoerced confessions, and allowed for detention without trial for prolonged
periods.'
Moreover, the judiciary has been overtly tied into the system of repression
by the use of judicial inquiries into torture and murder by the security forces.
In such a way, Lord Parker, the former Lord Chief Justice of England, and Lord
Widgery, the Lord Chief Justice of England, have both been used by the vehicle
of judicial inquiries to legitimate both the torture of suspected subversives' and
the killing of unarmed and peaceful protesters.8 9 It seems clear that this use of
the judiciary to legitimate repressive actions falls within Kitson's first alternative
for the legal system, but the government has been careful to maintain the facade
of Kitson's second alternative.
It is also apparent that within the Thompson-Kitson theory the concept of
184 While Kitson does not evince an awareness of the concept of the rule of law in the
classical sense, it is clear from his distaste for laws equally applied that the Diceyan concept
has not been seriously considered. See also A. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959).
185 KITSON, suprar note 140, at 69.
186 In R v. Londonderry Tustices, ex parte Hume, [1972] N.I. 91, the Northe'n Irish
Court of Appeal declared British Army action under the Special Powers Act to be ultra vires
and hence unconstitutional. In a matter of hours, the Northern Ireland Act, 1972, c.10, was
passed by the British Parliament retrospectively validating all such unconstitutional acts by
the security forces. See also Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland,
5 HUMAN RIGHTS 261, 290-91 '(1976).
187 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c.53, §'§ 5, 6 & 7; these measures
were originally proposed in Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal
with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland, CMND. 5185 (1972) [hereinafter cited as the
Diplock Report]. The Diplock Commission relied exclusively on the submissions of the secu-
rity forces and accepted the rationale of "operational necessity." See Diplock Report, 6.
188 See note 175 supra.
189 Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into the Events on Sunday 30th January
1972, H.L. 10 H.C. 220 (1972) [the Widgery Report]. For an excellent critique of this in-
quiry and its findings see S. DASH, JUSTICE DENIED: A CHALLENGE TO LORD WmGERY'S
REPORT ON BLOODY SUNDAY (1972).
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strategic hamlets or protected areas is central to the development of background
information. The rationale for this is given as protection of the population from
the insurgents, but there is the rather obvious additional advantage of preventing
the potentially hostile population from providing succor to the enemy. 9 ' Thus
the concept of protected zone or strategic hamlet of necessity requires a restriction
upon freedom of mobility or freedom of movement of the population as a whole
and the target group in particular. Clearly such a diminution in the freedom of
movement is more easily obtained in a system of society which does not possess
a written constitution guaranteeing freedom of movement. 9 ' The strategic
hamlet concept thus implies the use of force against citizens who have not been
proved, nor even suspected, of perpetrating an illegal act.
Crucial to Kitson's thesis is the use of psychological warfare by the govern-
ment. It seems clear that psychological warfare not only encompasses the use of
favorable positive propaganda but also the use of "black propaganda." This
form of propaganda involves the manipulation of the media to such an extent
that false information is in fact disseminated.' 92 In some jurisdictions this will
prove to be difficult without constitutional change as the media are often protected
by constitutional guarantees ensuring freedom of the press. In Northern Ireland,
however, without the benefit of formal guarantees of freedom of expres-
sion, it is a relatively simple matter to manipulate the media and curtail
freedom of expression. The role of psychological warfare has increased in im-
portance with the changing role of urban guerilla warfare in recent years from
direct terrorism to indirect terrorism. This change poses new problems because
the latter seeks to demonstrate to the populace that the state cannot govern in
order to undermine the social confidence in authority and in law.'93 This in-
direct form of terrorism relies upon the use of free and unfettered media which
are at liberty to report the successes (and failures) of the insurgent group. Seen in
this light, it becomes paramount that the government should be able to manipu-
late the media to such an extent as to curtail the impact of the success of terror-
ism upon the psyche of the populace. This should prevent the population at large
from either panicking or giving support to what may be perceived as a successful
insurgent force.9 The use of propaganda weapons such as this inevitably entails
190 KITSON, supra note 140, at 107.
191 This has been achieved in Belfast by blocking access to urban ghettoes and restricting
access and egress, after dark, to two routes controlled by Army checkpoints. Intimidation of
minorities within ghettoes has forced massive shifts in population in Northern Ireland and,
while this has not been perpetrated br the security forces, little action has been taken by the
military to prevent the concentration of people into ghettoes. On intimidation by officially
tolerated Protestant para-military groups, see Holland, The Newtownabbey Exodus, Hibernia
(Dublin), Aug. 20, 1976, at 8, col. 1.
192 See note 168 supra.
193 On the significance of social confidence in law, see T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, JUSTICE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1973). On the sociological concept of social solidarity, see E. DURKC-
HEl , TnE DIvISION oF LABOR IN SOCIETY, (3d ed. Simpson trans. 1964).
194 The most spectacular being the "Bloody Friday" bombing campaign by the IRA in
which the IRA, in accordance with its usual practice, gave three warnings to the police that
bombs were about to go off in several locations in Belfast. For some inexplicable reason the
military security authorities did not heed these warnings causing great loss of life and injury
among the civilian population. The government then indicated that no warnings had in fact
been given. The revulsion felt in most countries and, more importantly, by the civilian popula-
tion, was very great indeed and it was not until Parliament reconvened and questions were
asked some days later that it became apparent that warnings hid in fact been given but had
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both the curtailing of the freedom of the press and risking innocent lives so as to
achieve a military objective.'95 None of these manifestations of psychological
warfare are new and the important point for legal purposes is to clearly under-
stand that a free press is antithetical to the maintenance of modern counter-
insurgency tactics and strategy.'96 The implications of psychological warfare in
an urban environment are great indeed and the recent revelations regarding the
training of civil servants as well as military personnel in psychological warfare
technique do not augur well for the future of freedom of the press. 9
The key stage in Kitson's thesis emerges when a high degree of low level
intelligence information is collected to form background information. At some
point in the procedure, according to the Kitson scenario, innocent people-those
citizens acknowledged and known to be innocent-will be arrested without
reasonable and probable cause and interrogated. Moreover, by the use of the
holding charge such people will be interrogated, held incommunicado, and ulti-
mately convicted of a minor offense. The problem here is that this technique
is a clear and unequivocal manipulation of the legal system and judicial process.
Assuming that Kitson's theory is accurate, it is at least questionable for military
theoreticians to openly advocate subversion of both judicial process and civil
liberties by the vehicle of holding charges.
By the vehicle of the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973, the British army in
Northern Ireland was empowered to arrest innocent people and hold them in-
communicado for up to four hours. 9 ' In this way not only was low level intel-
ligence to be gathered under the guise of proving identity, but also background
low level information against third parties could be sifted and checked by inter-
rogation. "Screening" has been employed against whole sections of the com-
munity.' 99 The problem with screening, however, is that whatever the intent of
the security forces, it necessarily entails the dragnet arrest and detention of large
numbers of innocent people without probable cause.' 0 The drawback from the
military point of view is that, perhaps inevitably, many of the people so arrested
not been heeded by the security forces and thus the population put at considerable risk. For
a full explanation of this event and the news management involved see KELLY, supra note 11,
at 78-82. The reaction to the bombings enabled the British Army to remove the barricades
around Catholic ghettoes and occupy Catholic neighborhoods with no resistance. It has also
been recently revealed that these bombings ended secret peace negotiations which were taking
place, see Bloody Friday Bombs Ruined MacBride Moves-O'Connell, Irish Times (Dublin),
Feb. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Why the British Army psychological warfare unit should use this
situation to effectively terminate peace negotiations has yet to be explained.
195 Similarly, the British military fraternization and support for counter gangs of vigilantes
such as the UDA (Ulster Defense Association) and the UWC (Ulster Workers Council) have
similarly placed suspected terrorists at risk. See BLUNDY, supra note 168; R. Fisy, THE POINT
OF No RETURN: THE STRIKE WHIcH BROKE THE BRITISH IN ULSTER (1975).
196 Recent research into the role of war correspondence would seem to support the view
that the military in a war situation can quite easily control the dissemination of information
without censorship due to the disadvantageous position of the war correspondent and the
pressure for instant "copy" placed upon him by his superiors. See P. KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST
CASUALTY: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST AND MYTH MAKER FROM
THE CRIMEA TO VIETNAM (1975).
197 See O'CLERY, supra note 168.
198 See note 187, supra at s.12(1).
199 BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, supra note 1, at 43-45.
200 Screening of communities must be examined in the light of the British Army practice of
dragnet street and block searches, for example in 1974 a total of 71,914 house searches took
place, C. AcKROYD et al., supra note 132, at 38.
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will become alienated from the forces of law and order and be unappreciative of
the circumstances of their arrest and confinement. Moreover, if, as in the case
of the Northern Irish unrest, many people so detained are harshly treated during
detention, the screening policy runs the grave risk of being entirely counter-
productive. In this way whole communities have become alienated from the
forces of law and order.2 '
The Kitson scenario relates to what is termed "containment" in military
parlance. 2" Hostile areas are sealed off and house raids, block searches, and
screening methods are conducted. Ostensibly, these are executed in a search for
fugitives but they really serve to gather low level intelligence data. However,
while this may contain a hostile community it does not necessarily bring terrorists
into the open. The problem then becomes one of translating background infor-
mation into contact information.
It is at this juncture that the most controversial aspect of counter-insurgency
operations comes to the fore, as guerillas must be flushed out into the open. This
was attempted in Northern Ireland by staging various military operations, the
most famous being the so-called "Bloody Sunday" shootings in Londonderry.2
It was on this occasion that thirteen civil rights demonstrators were murdered
during an anti-internment protest demonstration in Londonderry. According to
Kitson's strategy, it would appear that these people were killed so as to make
the I.R.A. break their cover and fight in the open. The purpose of the military
strategy was to force the guerilla army to fight in the open and thus be sub-
jected to superior fire power of the security forces who had staged the event and
were fully prepared for it. It was the I.R.A., however, which scored a great
propaganda victory by exposing the British army counter-insurgency tactics of
killing innocent protestors while at the same time refusing to be provoked into
the open.0
The events in Northern Ireland have revealed that the security forces use
various methods, including torture and brutality, to persuade terrorists and
suspected terrorists to give information. It would be a mistake to regard inter-
rogation of suspected terrorists in this situation as merely following the classic
pattern of brutality as used in Chile or Brazil °0 It is true that in many instances
suspected terrorists have been routinely tortured upon capture, in some cases for
information, and in other cases by way of reprisal."' However, the significance
of sensory deprivation techniques used in Northern Ireland seems to base its
validity on the speed rationale.2"7 In other words captured guerilla suspects have
201 Normal policing is still impossible in many urban Catholic areas. In many areas the
police will not patrol without Army protection and will not patrol after dark in very many
more. See McKeown, R.U.C. In Search of a Role, Hibernia (Dublin), Nov. 28, 1975, at 8, col.
2 and Ryder, Ulsterization: Plans are Speeded up for Troops to Hand Over to Police and
U.D.R., Sunday Times (London), Apr. 25, 1976, at 3, col. 5.
202 KITSON, supra note 140, at 110.
203 See note 189 supra.
204 See also KELLY, supra note 11, at 28-31; WINCHESTER, supra note 168 passim.
205 For a world survey see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE (1973).
206 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREAT-
MENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1972) and Lowry, Draconian Powers: The New British Ap-
proach to Pre-Trial Detention of. Suspected Terrorists, COLUM. HuuAN RIGHTS L. Rav.
(forthcoming).
207 According to a British inquiry, speed made brutality and torture operationally necessary.
See note 175 supra. See also KELLY, supra note 11, at 35.
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been subjected to sensory deprivation techniques which quickly break down the
will of the suspect. These techniques were originally developed by the Soviet
KGB and are now in use by the intelligence service of the British army."' This
is separate and distinct from routine brutality in the sense that it requires special
training for interrogators who use scientific techniques to shut off stimuli to the
brain by the use of hooding and white noise. It must be conducted with some
care so as not to induce insanity prior to the acquisition of information." 9
The recent European Commission on Human Rights findings in the Ireland
v. United Kingdom case in Strassburg have confirmed that Britain has used these
techniques in the past on suspected terrorists and others.2"' While Kitson does
not specify that sensory deprivation techniques should be used, it is clear from
his experience in Kenya, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere that he was aware of
its use by the British army in such situations. 1 '
Kitson's theory is necessarily premised on methods which will speedily obtain
either cooperation or information from suspected terrorists, and it is clear that in
many situations nothing less than sensory deprivation and brutality may suffice.
Thus, the acceptance of counter-insurgency theory as enunciated by Thompson
and Kitson involves the use of torture by the authorities as an operational neces-
sity unless it is assumed that every captured terrorist will be cooperative and,
further, be speedily cooperative.212
The mistake made by some analysts in the past has been to view torture in
relative isolation. 11 Clearly, under the Thompson-Kitson theory torture becomes
an integral part of the counter-insurgency strategy of the military and is in-
evitable once the political decision has been taken to adopt the counter-insurgency
program. 4 As such, the legal system will be manipulated into either (a) ac-
cepting torture or (b) failing to recognize its use, or (c) investigating in an ad
hoc manner particular cases of torture without reference to its role in military
theory and strategy. All three alternatives have been utilized at various times in
Northern Ireland and the net result has been to regard instances of torture as
merely regrettable and isolated episodes resulting from the exigencies of a
particular stressful situation or the narrow facts of a particular case. However,
in the light of modern counter-insurgency theory, it can now be appreciated that
torture and brutality are an ongoing component of prevailing military theory and
tactics. The legal system, by merely awarding ex post facto civil damages"1 5 has
208 J. McGUFFIN, THE GUINEA PIGS (1974). On sensory deprivation, see generally
W. SARGENT, THE BATTLE FOR THE MIND (1957).
209 The pre-planning and special training of torturers were admitted by the second British
inquiry, per Lord Gardiner minority report, supra note 175, at ff 6, p. 12. According to
Amnesty International, the British continue to train approximately 240 soldiers per year in
these newer techniques of interrogation. The Leveller (London), Dec. 1976, at 4-5.
210 See note 175 supra.
211 See note 175 supra, majority reports, 10 at 2-3.
212 Judge Conaghan in Moore v. Ministry of Defense, Armagh County Court, (Feb. 10,
1972) noted the "primitive circumstances" of arrest procedures and that they were "pre-
conceived." This preconceived [brutality] was described as ". . . deliberate, unlawful and
harsh." See also LowRy, supra note 186, at 281-83. The Moore case was a civil suit for
damages for assault during detention and wrongful arrest.
213 See Twining, Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The Diplock Report, [1973]
CRiM. L. REv. 406.
214 On the precipitate use of counter-insurgency tactics in Northern Ireland see LowRY,
supra note 186, at 265-68.
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been found to be weak and unable to prevent torture because of its failure to
view torture in its theoretical context.
After this stage of the operations is complete and guerillas have presumably
come out into the open and been killed or captured and persuaded to cooperate,
the Kitson model then considers the continued acquisition of background informa-
tion which can be obtained by car and block searches and this is the current pos-
ture of the British army in Northern Ireland. The difficulty here is the clear dero-
gation of the notion of "reasonable cause" and resulting ongoing breach of human
rights. The random selection of cars and houses for search does not constitute
reasonable cause and would not justify a search warrant under normal criminal
process. Nevertheless, this seems to be the avenue envisaged by Kitson for keep-
ing intelligence gathering at an optimum level.
The legal implication of the use of community groups, however, is somewhat
difficult to assess as Kitson does not specify exactly how community groups could
be used except to say that they should be set up "when plausible reasons" exist216
and may be used to get to know the leadership of a community and the existing
relationship within the community of prominent people in general. How and by
whom are the "plausible reasons" created? In other words, special forces or the
military in general could be used to create pretexts or to increase the level of
security activities so that community groups would be invited to study a particular
problem seemingly generated by the civil unrest.21 Thus, if incidents reached a
level in a community approaching a high degree of discomfort in Kitson's scenar-
io, it would be appropriate for the community leaders to gather and channel
grievances towards the military who would be kindly disposed to receive them.
However, in doing so the military would in fact be acquiring information on the
potential or emerging political and social leaders in the community and would be
categorizing people for future surveillance and interrogation.21"
The- problem here is that community-based social workers, priests, and
others who have been used once in such a manner by the military authorities
might be reluctant to allow themselves to be used in a subsequent matter. This
might entail the further alienation of the military from the community workers
and could lead to yet more entrenched alienation from the community as a whole.
The morality of such a deception is yet another consideration.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are at least two readily identifiable alternative theories protective of
human rights when society is faced with violent unrest in the form of urban
guerilla activities. Initially, it is always open to society to identify and ameliorate
the political causes of civil unrest. This recognizes that the people involved in
215 Subsequent to the Moore ruling supra note 212, over 978 damage suits have been in-
itiated, less than one-third of which have been settled in agreed out of court terms. Apparently
the British government prefers to settle out of court in all cases and no cases have been tried
after the Moore decision. The Leveller (London), December 1976 at. 4-5.
216 KITsON, supra note 140, at 129.
217 For an assessment of the use of assassination by the British army see M. DILLON & D.
LEHIANE, POLITICAL MURDER IN NORTHERN IRELAND at 292 et seq. (1973).
218 For past practice of the British Army in this regard see Sunday Times Insight Team
(Ulster) (1972) at 236-43.
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political violence or terrorism are not necessarily gangsters or merely unthinking
individuals. In other words, a political approach necessitates the realization that
there may be socio-economic or irredentist causes of unrest and such a political
perspective presupposes that the problem of urban guerilla warfare is essentially
political in nature and capable of political solution.
In the case of Northern Ireland, this theory would entail recognition of the
problem presented-the denial of self-determination to one-third of the popula-
tion-as one capable of political solution, albeit that radical means may be
needed to achieve that end.219 Nevertheless, it must be realized that often the
causes of unrest are capable of amelioration or solution by non-revolutionary and
non-violent means. This is not to say that governments will not regard guerilla
campaigns by their very nature as antithetical to democratic process but rather to
recognize that guerillas are not necessarily thugs and gangsters but rather an
unpleasant symptom of a societal wrongs.22 °
Such societal wrongs are generally economic or political and permeate
society to the extent that, in the case of Northern Ireland, a major section of the
population labor under a deep and continuing sense of injustice against the
established rule.221 Thus when the civil rights campaign commenced in Northern
Ireland in 1967-68 the immediate symptoms of unrest were the civil rights
campaign for one man one vote and similar egalitarian reforms. The government
was unable to respond to these needs, perceiving such reform to be counter to
the interests of the state as a whole, and this resulted inevitably in intransigence
by the majority and violence on the part of the deprived minority.22 This in no
way justifies the use of violence by the guerillas,22' but merely goes to explain that
the cause was in many respects political in origin.
In a narrow sense, Kitson recognizes that political causes play a part when
he seeks to drive a wedge between the moderates supporting a just cause and the
hard core who seek to use that cause to obtain a further goal. Thus, according
to Kitson, the I.R.A. and hard core nationalists must be separated from the
moderate or the middle class civil rights activists. This separation could be ac-
complished, in theory, by acceding to the demands of the civil rights movement
without the state being necessarily threatened.22 4 In some senses this may be true,
219 A British withdrawal is feasible if safeguards for the Northern Protestants are included
in such a concept. Moreover, the British achieved a withdrawal in similar circumstances in
Kenya in the 1950's after safeguarding the interests of the white minority. Similarly France
faced such a problem in Algeria. A phased withdrawal with economic inducements for the
Northern Protestants could ensure a minimal quantum of violence. Of course, the British
army might have to enforce such a plan against the wishes of "hard core" Protestant extremists.
220 The rebirth of the I.R.A. in 1970 in the form of the Provisional I.R.A. is based on the
reluctance of dominant Protestant politicians to reform society. See O'BRIEN, supra note 8,
at 205; Sunday Times Insight Team, supra note 218 passim, and LowRy supra note 186, at
261-75.
221 For a useful historical analysis see FARRELL, supra note 3 passim, and G. BELL, THE
PROTESTANTS OF ULSTER (1976) which analyzes the nature and extent of Protestant privilege
and its ideology and provides useful insights into the extent of entrenched patterns of dis-
crimination against Catholics. See also Lowry, Religious Discrimination in Northern Ireland, J.
INTERNAT. L. & POLIICS (forthcoming).
222 For an analysis of the early civil rights struggle see LowRy, supra note 186, at 261-75.
223 On the justification of political violence see N. CHOIISKY, FOR REASONS OF STATE
(1973); T. HONDERICH, THREE ESSAYS ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE '(1976).
224 Such an attempt was made by the vehicle of the Sunningdale Agreement which was
accepted by the Catholic middle class and moderate opinion but was rejected by the I.R.A.
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but it becomes increasingly difficult for a government to accede to, for example,
effective affirmative action programs in the field of employment discrimination
since to do so would effectively undermine the rationale for the state of Northern
Ireland and the hegemony of the Northern Protestants.22 The state of Northern
Ireland was in part created to preserve a protected enclave of Protestant privilege
for a minority of Irishmen who are Protestant. Thus, to provide for equal access
to employment for Roman Catholics would be to sever the unique relationship
between the Protestant working class and the Protestant elite2 . which has sought
to entrench its power in Northern Ireland through discrimination in various
fields including employment. The whole raison d'etre of the state was to seek to
secure and entrench a privileged position for the Irish Protestant minority in a
particular area of Ireland where it happened to be the majority.22
Thus, if ameliorative reforms were implemented encompassing affirmative
action or positive discrimination in favor of Catholics in Northern Ireland in the
area of employment, it would be tantamount to attack the underlying justification
for the state. This seems to be one of the major dilemmas plaguing British policy
makers since the recent civil rights unrest commenced in Northern Ireland.
While the first alternative to counter-insurgency theory is always to seek a re-
formative solution, it must be recognized that reforms and compromise solutions
of this sort can only be obtained at a price, and this price may be unacceptable
to the ruling government.
The unique problem presented by Northern Ireland, or any other colonial
power in an alien country, is that the issue of self-determination cannot be faced
without alienating a significant proportion of the population who depend on the
colonial power for their privileged position. However, common ground must be
found between the privileged group of Protestants occupying power as the
dominant group in Northern Ireland and the disaffected nationalist minority who
support both the I.R.A. and the more acceptable nationalist counsensual political
parties supportive of irredentist ideology.
A second alternative which is always open to a government to utilize in a
time of guerilla warfare or political violence is the due process model as en-
visioned by Packer.2  Packer creates two models-the crime control model and
the due process model.229 While it is inappropriate to regard the Kitson approach
as in any way analogous to Packer's crime control model, the due process model
has been used by Britain in countering its only major threat presented by urban
guerillas prior to the advent of the I.R.A.
In 1970 a group of anarchists in Britain known as the "Angry Brigade"
embarked upon a series of sporadic bomb attacks upon the homes of prominent
,as falling short of self-determination. Paradoxically the Sunningdale Agreement was wrecked
by militant Protestants who thought too much had been conceded. See Ireland (Tripartite
Conference) 866 H.C. Debs, col. 28, December 10, 1973, and for an explanation of the Protes-
tant General Strike which led to its demise, see Fisx, supra note 195.
225 See also LowRy, supra note 221.
226 BELL, supra note 221. This is the recurrent theme in Bell's analysis of the creation and
use of Protestant power in Northern Ireland.
227 FAReELL, supra note 3 passim.
228 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
229 Id. at 8-16.
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people and various other symbolic targets. 3 ° At first the authorities were com-
pletely baffled by the appearance of this anarchist phenomenon about which
little was known. However, as has been detailed in a recent study, the Special
Branch of Scotland Yard quickly adapted itself to closely monitor and study the
publications of anarchist groups and keep anarchists under general surveillance
without violating their civil rights. This method ultimately paid dividends in that
the violent anarchist group was arrested and convicted by normal process of law.
The problem here is that it was necessary to devote considerable resources to
effect continued surveillance of a relatively small group of anarchists. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that the due process model can in fact work if sufficient resources
are allocated to the task in the form of continued surveillance and intelligent
use of criminal charges such as conspiracy so that preventive measures can be
taken without putting society at risk.2 3' Thus, it may be argued that the only
barrier to successful use of conspiracy charges and due process of law is the
financial cost involved, which is admittedly high, in maintaining a highly organ-
ized police surveillance team and forensic squad necessary to gather and evaluate
evidence against subversive groups.
However, the fact is that the due process model has never been seriously
tried in Northern Ireland as emergency powers have in fact been in operation
since the state came into being. This is unfortunate since the due process model
has the built-in advantage of not provoking a backlash to repressive measures
which almost inevitably emanates from counter-insurgency theory. There is no
diminution of respect for law and social confidence in the legal system, and the
rule of law is preserved. The due process model does not run the risk of the state
losing control of counter gangs and vigilante groups such as the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) 22
The other attribute which the due process model possesses, in contrast to the
counter-insurgency approach of Kitson, is that while Kitson visualizes reforms as
splitting moderates from the hard core insurgents in a manipulative "carrot
and stick" fashion, Kitson does not fully comprehend that the "carrot" may
become rapidly irrelevant due to the bitterness which the "stick" engenders in
the target group. This certainly seems to be the case in the Northern Irish urban
ghettos. Thus, if Kitson's theory is either misapplied or merely mistimed, the
consequences are highly significant in that the reforms needed to divide the
guerillas from their popular support will, in some instances, be viewed as a sign
of weakness without the concomitant benefit of alienating the moderates from
the extremists.233
Of special interest to lawyers, of course, is that the due process model pre-
230 For a full account of this episode, see G. CARR, THE ANGRY BRIGADE (1975).
231 The conspiracy offense in British law is wide and vague in the extreme and is about
to undergo reform. On reform proposals see The Law Commission Report on Conspiracy and
Criminal Law Reform, No. 76 (1976); on the scope of conspiracy see R. HAZELL, CONSPIRACY
A'ND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1974); G. ROBERTSON, WHOSE CONSPIRACY? (1974) and J. SMITH &
B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW at 175-90 (3d ed. 1973).
232 The apparent powerlessness of the state to control Protestant para-military groups has
been shown by FISK, supra note 195.
233 The prorogation of the devolved Stormont Parliament in 1972 has thus been widely held
to be a "defeat" for the British and the Protestants by the I.R.A. rather than a political
gambit or concession.
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serves the integrity of legal institutions and law officers. If the due process model
is maintained and seen to work, then social confidence in the law and in the legal
system is fostered, whereas the use and manipulation of the legal system and its
offices under the Kitson model run the grave risk of the public perceiving law
and the legal system to be merely additional instruments of arbitrary repression.
This problem of public perception has been particularly troublesome in Northern
Ireland in that the transition from the civil rights campaign to guerilla warfare
has been linked by some observers to the decline in social confidence in law and
legal institutions.234 If legal institutions are not seen to behave impartially but
instead are viewed merely as an arm of repression, then it becomes almost in-
evitable that dissidents will turn to violence to achieve political objectives.
One further problem with counter-insurgency theory as opposed to the due
process model is that it is essentially a theory of containment rather than military
victory. Thus, the forces of law and order are seen to be merely containing the
guerillas, rather than vigorously pursuing the instigators of violence. 35 This has
a deleterious effect on the morale of the soldiers and of that portion of the civilian
population which is supportive of the forces of law and order. Sometimes, as in
Northern Ireland, this leads to the growth of counter-revolutionary terrorist
organizations,236 some of which may be beyond the control of the forces of law
and order.237
Thus, counter-insurgency theory, by placing the integrity of the legal system
in jeopardy, also runs the grave risk of permitting vigilantes to usurp the
policing function. This would not be so under a due process model in which the
forces of law and order would be perceived as an impartial arm of the state and
the judiciary would be kept separate from the state. Moreover, since the target
group in the counter-insurgency theory is the so-called hostile population, it would
seem that the repressive powers envisaged by counter-insurgency theory would
not be applied equally but rather only to the target community. In the case of
Northern Ireland this means that the Protestant majority are not subjected to the
full panoply of military powers of repression as are the Catholic community,
which is comprised of both dissident groups and their moderate supporters.
23 8
The further and most important problem presented by counter-insurgency
theory is the danger to civil liberty which is implicit in the use of emergency
powers. These powers, when allied to modem counter-insurgency theory, negate
any notion of the "right to be left alone" because of the reliance on dragnet
arrests and the demise of reasonable cause. Moreover, largely unscrutinized and
wholly repressive powers once enjoyed may not be easily discontinued.23 This
"slippery slope" argument is of particular relevance to Northern Ireland when it
234 See T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 73, at 8-26.
235 It was just such a claim which contributed to the recent Protestant General Strike in
Northern Ireland, see McHardy, Loyalists 11-day Loser, Manchester Guardian Weekly, May
22, 1977 at 5, col. 3.
236 Nelson, Ulster: Gunmen in Politics, New Society, May 1, 1975 at 255.
237 Behind the Assassinations, Hibernia, Oct. 25, 1974 at 4, col. 2.
238 See LAW AND STATE, supra note 1, at 78-151.
239 Already there is some evidence to suggest that some specific wide repressive powers may
be unwarranted but, nevertheless, remain law. See Price, Less and Less Temporary, Hibernia,
Dec. 12, 1975 at 11, col. 1.
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is recalled that emergency powers have been in force continually since the origin
of the state.
If nothing else the Northern Irish experience has demonstrated certain
weaknesses in the operation of the European Convention on Human Rights.'"
Although many of the enumerated rights are vague and drafted on a high level
of generality, when taken together the Convention may fairly be said to reflect
the minimum standards necessary to preserve the rule of law and due process
from arbitrary abuse by the executive in a democratic state.241 However, in an
emergency, the executive can derogate from the constraints of the Convention242
and the judicially imposed standard of executive abuse, "the margin of apprecia-
tion" test,24' is exceedingly wide and vague. This permits executive evasion of
the European Convention in emergencies." But the use of the European Con-
vention would at least assure judicial scrutiny of executive action in emergency,
whereas British common law does not. 4
Clearly the Northern Irish experience indicates the overriding need to devise
a system in which executive action affecting human rights is justiciable. This is
not to say that the judiciary should scrutinize any and all activities, but to em-
phasize the necessity for adequate controls on executive power and discretion.
The ultra vires doctrine, as interpreted by British courts in emergency situations,
has been an inadequate check upon the potential for arbitrary use and abuse of
executive power.
A preferable criterion is to be found in the American "clear and present
danger" test246 which has the advantage of ensuring that, at some point, the
executive is put into a position in which it must justify its assumption of wide
executive power. Moreover, a clear and present danger doctrine could dispense
with the somewhat odious distinction between individual rights and property
rights in emergencies under British common law. Such a test could also con-
240 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome
(1950), Cmnd. 2894 (1950); 156 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 915; I. BROWNLiE, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971).
241 For a full explanation, see A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2d ed. 1977).
242 Supra note 240, at Article XV, but note that Article III provides an absolute right not
to be tortured and nations may not derogate from this provision. However, due process can be
suspended.
243 Lawless v. Ireland, Application No. 332/57, 4 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
438. "Apprehended" emergencies are included in this criterion, see Denmark, Norway, Sweden
and Netherlands v. Greece, Application No. 3321/67, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
See also ROBERTSON, supra note 241, at 39-41 & 111-12.
244 The breadth of this criteria was shown clearly in ROBERTSON, supra note 241, at 134.
The concept behind this doctrine is that Article 15 has to be read in the context of
the rather special subject matter with which it deals: the responsibilities of a Govern-
ment for maintaining law and order in times of war or public emergency threatening
the life of the nation. The concept of. the margin of appreciation is that a Govern-
ment's discharge of these responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appre-
ciating complex factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public
interest; and that, once the Commission or the Court is satisfied that the Govern-
ment's appreciation is at least on the margin of the powers conferred by Article 15,
then the interest which the public itself has in effective Government and in the
maintenance of order justifies and requires a decision in favor of the legality of the
Government's appreciation.
245 Unlike most international tribunals the European Commission and Court will receive
individual applications, per Article 25. See also ROBERTSON, supra note 241, at 149-53.
246 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
'(1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with
Freedom of Speech, 1 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1952).
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tribute to the judicial definition of limitations on the use of dragnet arrest, search,
interrogation and detention without trial favored by contemporary counter-
insurgency theorists. A justiciable clear and present danger doctrine must, in the
light of the Northern Irish experience, constitute a minimal criterion for balanc-
ing human rights against the necessity doctrine'in an emergency.24 '
The prevailing policy of judicial abnegation may be thought to preserve
judicial neutrality during upheaval, but it is suggested that judicial abnegation
is socially dangerous, since the consequence of this policy is to deny a useful and
desirable forum for impartial scrutiny and barriers to abuse of power. Thus,
judicial abnegation may have the social effect of channeling protest and dissent
towards violence.
The doctrine of necessity at common law has never been adequately de-
fined but is, functionally, protective of the executive in emergencies. However,
it does not follow that non-justiciable necessity does not have an identifiable
content. By focusing on current military theory it is possible to discern a clear
but unlimited content in the form of operational necessity. In R. v. Allen24
military trial and execution were justified, and legally upheld, on the specific
ground of operational necessity. Similarly, the denial of due process in Northern
Ireland seems to be firmly based on operational necessity in the Diplock Report4 9
which foreshadowed the Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland) Act 1973.250
Brutality and torture of suspects have been accepted by a Judicial Inquiry ex-
plicitly on the grounds of operational necessity.25 ' And the silence of the Gardiner
Report22 on "screening" or acquisition of low-level intelligence involving dragnet
arrests of wholly innocent nonsuspects at least tacitly accepts the justification of
operational necessity.
A close scrutiny of Kitson's work makes it possible to deduce that opera-
tional necessity in the urban guerilla context is less a factor of the exigencies of
combat and more a predetermined theory with a: discernible form and content.
Significantly, Kitson's theory includes telishing,22 that is, the deliberate punish-
ment of innocent people, which is the clearest denial of due process imaginable
as well as the negation of all commonly accepted notions of human rights.
Furthermore, the Widgery Inquiry254 into the shooting of unarmed demonstra-
tors, and the House of Lords' ruling in the Attorney-General's Reference 5 case,
in no way inhibit the summary execution of either suspects or innocents mistaken
for suspects.
247 On the doctrine Salus Populii Suprema Lex see LowRY, supra note 186, at 314-22.
248 See note 193 supra.
249 See note 187 supra. It is clear that the Diplock Report merely reflects the advice of the
security forces as the Inquiry did not receive any other evidence, see further LAW AND STATE,
supra note 1, at 39-41.
250 See note 187 supra.
251 See note 187 suprh.
252 Report of a Committee to Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human
Rights, Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 5847 (1975). On the
Gardiner Report in general, see LowRY, supra note 186, at 308-14. For the tacit acceptance of
screening, see Security: The Missing Chapter, Fortnight Rev. (Belfast) No. 98, Feb. 1975 at
5, col. 1.
253 See note 173 supra.
254 See note 189 supra.
255 See note 113 supra.
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The current policy in Northern Ireland is to criminalize political violence.5 '
Suspected guerillas are now held for up to seven days incommunicado and often
coerced into signing confessions.1 7 They are then tried without a jury and with a
reverse onus placed upon an accused regarding the admissibility of the confession.
Since, as a practical matter, it is impossible for an accused to show that he was
tortured, he is convicted as a common criminal and usually sentenced to a long
term of imprisonment. In this highly structured manner, society is able to dispose
of both urban guerillas and political sympathizers or dissidents while publicly
proclaiming that there are no political prisoners, merely convicted criminals.
The continuing prison unrest and hunger strikes to obtain political prison status
may be viewed, therefore, as a post-sentence effort to achieve internationally
recognized minimum standards of treatment and a furtherance of the struggle
for human rights.2"' That society should structure its legal system in this way may
be seen as a considered attempt to criminalize politically violent and non-violent
dissenters so as to, within the Kitson scenario, split moderates from the "hard
core" who have been elaborately processed and labelled as criminal deviants
rather than political offenders. This too may be seen as a further use and abuse
of the legal system by the executive and, in the long term, may irreparably harm
social confidence in law and the legal system.
A major mistake, although an understandable error in a fluid situation, is to
adopt an approach common to many civil libertarians and proponents of human
rights in adopting an ad hoc view of terrorism and human rights. Many liber-
tarians, although responsive to the last revelation or the latest atrocity, have not
placed such incidents into a broader theoretical perspective. It is suggested that
more can be learned by placing specific incidents and patterns of terror and
counter-terror into a theoretical justificatory framework so as to measure and
adequately balance the overall impact of counter-insurgency repression on civil
liberties and human rights. In this way the principled efforts of successive Irish
governments to expose and constrain the use of torture and discrimination before
the European Court of Human Rights may be placed in their proper legal and
societal perspective. The non-justiciable nature of the doctrines of necessity and
operational necessity may be shown to give the executive carte blanche to ignore
and abrogate human rights. As events have escalated and patterns of unscrutin-
ized repression become refined and entrenched in Northern Ireland, there is the
manifest danger that human dignity and life itself may be placed in even greater
jeopardy.
Perhaps the only approach now open to proponents of human rights is to
adopt an idea from the military theorists, that of "total strategy. 2 5 9 Just as to
the military total strategy means the unification of military, legal, and political
structures and ideology, libertarians must adopt a "total strategy" for the propa-
256 RYDER, supra note 201.
257 For an analysis of current pre-trial detention law and practice, see Lowry, supra note
206.
258 On the treatment of Irish political prisoners in British jails, see Logan, Treatment of
Irish Prisoners Convicted of Terrorist Offenses, 73 LAw GUARDIAN GAZETTE 980 (1976). For
a first person account of prison brutality, see H. FEENEY, IN CARE OF HER MAJESTY'S PRISONS
(1976).
259 See note 153 supra.
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gation and preservation of human rights. Such a "total strategy" must be
predicated upon a fuller understanding of the ideology of terror and counter-
insurgency and should endeavor to enunciate a critical theory of executive power
in an emergency so as to maximize liberty in a crisis. It is suggested that this is
the major lesson to be learned from nine years of terror and counter-terror in
Northern Ireland.
